Hands Off the People of Iran

On February 8 1971, 50 years ago, the geurrillaist left began its armed struggle by attacking a gendamerie post at Siahkal. Three police were killed and two comrades rescued. Yassamine Mather spoke to Ardeshir Mehrdad. He was a member of the Organisation of Iranian People’s Fadai until 1980 and later became editor of Iran Bulletin

How long were you a prisoner during the shah’s reign?

After two short arrests at the age of 17 and 20, I was imprisoned twice during the rule of the Pahlavi regime. The first time was from January 1968 to March 1969, and the second from early December 1974 to late March 1977 – more than two years.

When did you change your opinion on armed struggle?

I believed in the necessity of armed struggle up until the revolution (even today I can’t deny the necessity of resorting to armed violence as one form of struggle under certain circumstances and with certain preconditions), but I have been sceptical of the effectiveness of guerrilla tactics since 1977.

Considering your knowledge and understanding of the subject today, how do you evaluate the armed struggles during the shah’s reign? And if you are critical about it, what other tactics would have been effective, in your opinion?

The guerrilla movement revived the politically distressed and helpless society of the years following 1964-65 by promoting revolutionary morals and values, devotion, courage and sacrifice. However, it was unable to combine armed struggle with less costly forms of political struggle, and therefore was unable to organise and mobilise the social classes in order to form a pervasive socialist movement on a mass level.

Since the armed struggle was solely focused on opposing and overthrowing the ruling regime and the shah, it was unable to pay any significant attention to the other areas of class struggle. And so sexual, cultural and social oppressions were taken less seriously. In conclusion, the ‘small engine and big engine’ theory encompassed a huge mental burden, and neither the strategies nor the tactics of the armed struggle theory could sufficiently meet the needs of a socialist movement with a widespread and strong class and social base.

Did your assessment of the protests change when you were released from prison?

When I and (a few months later) my other comrades, Saeed Sultanpour and Mehrdad Pakbaz, were released from prison, the protests had not yet spread across the masses. Apart from the riots of the Afsarieh slums, 10 poetry nights at the Goethe Institute, and the poetry-reading session at Aria Mehr University, which led to a sit-down strike and street protest, no other significant movements were made. However, even these indicated a great upcoming change and a society ready to erupt.

However, this transformation in society was hidden from us and we were not able to clearly identify the scale of the movements, their direction, and their class orientation. The riot of the Afsarieh residents, the arson attack on a police station, and the street riot after Saeed Sultanpour’s poetry-reading at Aria Mehr University had all agitated us, but had not opened our eyes to the uninstructed power of the deprived masses and the explosive strength of the younger generations. Our world revolved around the universities, offices, factories and the streets; there was no place for small workshops, informal work, mass unemployment or semi-unemployment in our world yet. In that world, the back streets, social reproductions, slums and the homeless were absent.

In early 1978, the three of us and a number of others left the country in order to go to Palestine for military training. During that time the rate of change surprised us very soon: the situation would change so drastically in a single day, it was as if several years had passed. The changes took place so fast that one could barely keep track of them. It was then that we decided to continue our struggle against the shah’s regime in a different manner abroad. We formed the ‘From Prison to Exile’ committee and organised campaigns in Europe.

The growing presence of people on the streets initially made us hopeful that a mass, armed struggle and an armed war could be on the way, and it would be our duty to organise this uprising. This assessment of the situation defined our practical duties, which were carried out in coordination with the Organisation of People’s Fadai Guerrillas members abroad (comrades Heydar and Nasrin from Paris): a series of rallies and continuous street demonstrations in various cities in Europe; numerous press conferences; interviews with prestigious publications; the launch of a secret publication, and writing and printing analytical articles, pamphlets, books and educational writings; cooperation with the Iranshahr publication (published by Saedi and Shamloo in London); and joint action with student confederations – namely the February 9 confederation.

While our collective perspective was vigilant at the time, it neglected to acknowledge the true danger of political Islam, which resulted in all our campaigns against the shah being mixed with criticism of the Islamic currents and the dangers of political Islam and Khomeini himself. Such a stance put us under pressure for two reasons: on the one hand, the majority of the political organisations abroad believed that overthrowing the shah’s regime was their main goal and duty, and therefore addressing any other topics (especially the Islamic currents) would lead to a division in the united front and benefit the shah’s regime. On the other hand, we were under direct and incessant pressure from Islamic groups and organisations from various countries. I remember well that our sessions in Paris were interrupted twice due to a disturbance caused by Ghotb Zadeh and Bani Sadr. And I dare say that Saeed Sultanpour’s death sentence was not issued after the revolution, but in the first meetings of the From Prison to Exile committee in the European countries in the middle of 1978. However, fully discussing this matter should be left for another time.

We regarded the mass as unformed, disentangled, lacking political and class knowledge, and with conservative cultural tendencies. The masses that had joined the movement had a strong tendency to be attracted to a charismatic, populist, conservative and religious figure or group. In other words, we saw the opportunist nature of the clergy’s political Islam, but we did not see the tendency of the amorphous mass towards following them. Of course, as far as I can remember, all the leftwing organisations were negligent towards this matter.

Undoubtedly, economic-oriented tendencies, disregarding cultural factors, anti-imperialist attitudes, growth theory, over-estimating the Shah’s powers, setting his overthrow as the only and ultimate goal, and many more other factors each contributed in some way to this negligence. This discussion requires further elaboration, which is out of the scope of (but not to say irrelevant to) the current interview and should be discussed another time.

How did you assess the position of the radical left towards these protests, and has this assessment changed?

I think I have somewhat covered this question in my answer to the previous question.

Do you evaluate the tactics of your organisation/group at that time as positive?

No.

In your opinion, did we ever face a situation of dual power?

Yes, at the early stages of the revolution and before the start of the Iran-Iraq war. Specifically, in certain regions of the country, such as Kurdistan, Turkmen Sahra and parts of Khuzestan, as well as in the management of large industrial productions – the areas in which the workers’ councils had taken control of and crossed the borders of capitalism: oil, gas, steel, pipe-making, some agricultural industries, etc.

How do you assess the reasons behind the religious groups’ success in organising the protests? Were the clergy less oppressed, compared to the left, during Pahlavi’s rule, and was there a large gap between the common people and the guerrillas?

I think two factors played a role. First, the hierarchy of the Shi’ite clergy, with tens of thousands of active followers throughout the country and the wide network of mosques, Hussainiyas, religious schools, Tekyehs and religious boards. Second – more importantly and as I mentioned before – the tendency of the unformed and ignored masses towards following the religious and the clergy. The indignant, oppressed masses were handicapped by severe mental poverty and cultural conservatism. These people were unaware of their own power and had been looking for a long-awaited saviour for years (the 12th Imam, who would appear on the moon!).

In your opinion, which social classes supported the armed struggle movement and the People’s Fadai organisation?

An increasing number of university students, grade school students and youth, and some intellectuals, writers, and artists.

Did the radical left have any supporters among the working class? If the answer is negative, what do you believe the reason was?

Very few. Most labour activists before the revolution were inclined towards the Tudeh Party of Iran.

There were various reasons, including limitations on the distribution of propaganda and information among the various classes of labourers and workers; and an imperceptible and ineffective presence in the labourers’ workplaces and residences (even if the activists chose to stay in a lower-class neighbourhood, it was for security and cover-up reasons, and not for political presence and organic engagement).

How did this support affect significant days, such as February 11 1979?

At the time of the mass uprising, psychological and emotional factors were determinate. In those days, the Fadai guerrilla was a symbol of resistance and heroism, and not an indication of a political scheme, class demands and socio-economic alternatives. Due to their theoretical weakness and inability to organise during those golden opportunities, Fadai guerrillas remained merely a symbol among the people. Which, of course, made them fade away and took away their future capability for impact and effectiveness.

First published in the Weekly Worker: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1334/from-symbol-to-failure/

Yassamine Mather says that the Siahkal incident 50 years ago marked a break with the passivity of ‘official communism’, but the guerrillaist left was hopelessly outmanoeuvred when it came to the reality of revolution in Iran

Fifty years ago this week, the town of Siahkal in northern Iran was the scene of an armed uprising that produced the revolutionary Fadai movement. The young militants who took up arms against Mohamed Reza Pahlavi’s regime were rebelling not just against the shah, but also against the policies of the Tudeh Party – the traditional ‘official communist’ party in Iran, whose name had become synonymous with passivity, compromise and betrayal. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union did not support the Iranian revolutionary movement against the shah, and the Tudeh Party followed the USSR’s line.

In the period following World War II, Tudeh’s policy towards prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh fluctuated from one extreme to another: first they attacked him as an “agent of American imperialism”, and then they gave him support during and after the July 1952 uprising against the shah. Tudeh called for the nationalisation of the British-owned oilfields, but opposed the same policy when applied to those owned and operated by the Soviet Union.

The CIA coup of 1953 marked the end of the nationalist government, but it also destroyed Tudeh, which until then had been the largest left party in the Middle East. Its networks were smashed and most of its cadre were arrested or forced to flee to the Soviet Union: “Between 1953 and 1957, Iranian security forces tracked down the whole Tudeh underground and more than half the party membership.”¹

Tudeh had called for broad alliances and the peaceful road to socialism, but by the 1960s there was a rebellion against it amongst the revolutionary youth. The individuals and groups that formed the Fadai were part of this new wave of the radical left. However, to take up arms against the regime in the way it did was suicidal, because it was inevitable that a large number of those who did so would be killed – 13 out of the 19 of what is called the original cell of the Fadai died in armed confrontation and many members and supporters were later executed.

The Fadai was formed through the merging of two groups on the Iranian left, both opposed to Tudeh. One was led by Massoud Ahmadzadeh, who came from a religious family and had become very much influenced by Maoism. His politics were a combination of Maoism and guerrillaism. One of his closest allies was Amir-Parviz Pouyan – someone influenced by the événements of 1968 in France, by Maoism and the need for armed struggle. Ahmadzadeh’s book Armed struggle: both strategy and tactics was for many years the bible of the Fadai. Amir-Parviz Pouyan also wrote a book called The necessity of armed struggle against the theory of survival. The ‘theory of survival’ referred to the line of the Tudeh Party, against which the Fadai were rebelling.

However, Ahmadzadeh also destroyed the illusion that the national bourgeoisie could have a revolutionary or progressive role. Describing the democratic character of the revolution, he wrote: “Struggle against imperialist domination – ie, world capitalism – has some elements of the struggle with capitalism” and therefore “some elements of the socialist revolution are born in this struggle”. On the role of proletariat, he stated: “The proletariat [in Iran] is numerically weak, but its special qualities and capabilities to organise are stronger than any other class.”

Bijan Jazani was another leading figure. He came from a different tendency – the youth organisation of the Tudeh Party, but he rebelled against Tudeh and agreed to bring his small forces into the new organisation.

To summarise the politics which influenced the Fadai in that original period, one could say that a unique version of guerrillaism and Maoism dominated, but there was also a very simplistic attitude of ‘anti-revisionism’, which did not have much theory behind it. The founders were against the changes represented by the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and adopted a line claiming to be independent of both the USSR and China. However, they remained very much influenced by Stalinism.

In debates, for example, with Communist Unity, which was more of a middle-of-the-road student organisation, the Fadai were very clear on where they stood on the Soviet Union. Their position was that until 1962 the USSR was 65% good and 35% bad, which, I believe, is a Maoist interpretation. However, as China adopted the theory of social-imperialism, and later the ‘three worlds’ theory, the Fadai and other Iranian leftwing groups distanced themselves from China and Maoism.

Building support

The people who lost their lives in the 1971 operation and subsequent military operations had considerable effect on the youth and student movement in Iran. Not quite what Ahmadzadeh had predicted – that the ‘small motor’ would make the ‘large motor’ move and the whole country would rebel. But the student movement became very sympathetic to this new, emerging left and was very much influenced by it, as were many young workers.

1971-79 shaped the political thought of the generation which came to the Iranian revolution as leaders of the Fadai. So it is an important period. We are talking about an organisation that was mainly underground, preparing for armed warfare and organising the occasional bank robbery.

Its activities were sporadic – the Fadai killed a couple of American military personnel in Tehran and a number of the shah’s generals. There were losses, particularly because, as an armed organisation, members of the Fadai could simply be killed on the street. On average they expected a new recruit to live six months as a guerrilla. This denied the Fadai a mass base and endangered anyone who supported them, such as university students, academics, etc, because supporters were regarded as part of the armed movement by association. Around 370 leftwingers were executed in this period, of which 60% were Fadai.

Many Fadai spent this period in prison, where a debate developed over the organisation’s line. Jazani moved away from some of the original positions. For example, in his book United front against dictatorship Jazani was clearly rejecting earlier positions taken by Ahmadzadeh and Pouyan. However, in another book, Capitalism and revolution in Iran, Jazani provided a valuable analysis of the shah’s regime.

Jazani was killed in Evin prison in 1975 – the shah’s regime claimed he was trying to escape from the high-security jail. It is therefore difficult to assess whether some of the writings and ideas attributed to him were truly his own opinions. The people around him became leaders of the Fadai. By 1979 there was a mass revolutionary movement in Iran and jailed members of the Fadai got their freedom, some during the February uprising, when people smashed through the prison doors.

During this period the Fadai had become a real force among students and young people, gaining popularity as a result of its past actions (although some of it was actually populist myth). However, it was now very divided, with Jazani’s supporters following one political line and Ahmadzadeh’s another.

There were two debates going on and one was over the armed struggle. Jazani supporters contended that the armed struggle line, as both strategy and tactic, was mistaken, and in that they were right, because it had separated the Fadai from its potential mass base. But, on the other hand, some Jazani supporters were now excusing Soviet foreign policy and saw a positive role for the national bourgeoisie.

What was quite clear was that throughout this period there was very little done in terms of theoretical work. The book that everyone read and which gave them “everything”, according to one of the Fadai elders I know, was Lenin’s What is to be done? It gave the Fadai their stance against sectarianism, economism, syndicalism and anarchism – their whole analysis was based on it. But they did not necessarily understand it properly, especially given the problematic translation into Farsi by the USSR Academy of Sciences, which emphasises centralism over democracy. A recent Persian translation by comrade Torab Saleth has tried to correct these errors.

Throughout this period the Fadai had failed to make any headway in the working class or in Iranian society as a whole. In the universities, however, they had a great deal of support, as became obvious at the time of the revolution. Among the intellectuals – especially the poets, including some of the most famous – there was an amazing amount of praise for the Fadai. One thing is clear, though – they had no strategy about what to do, now that the revolutionary situation had arrived. That was the problem of February 1979.

While the clergy used the period of economic crisis (1974-79) to build their base, to make propaganda, taking advantage of their position in the mosque to organise and mobilise, the Fadai in prison were still debating in very abstract terms such questions as the united front against the dictatorship. In addition, the shah was far more lenient towards the religious groups than he was towards the left, for whom building a mass organisation was much more difficult. They attempted to go to the factories, but all they could do was distribute leaflets and then disappear.

It is not, therefore, a question of the February revolution being hijacked: more the fact that the left was simply not prepared for it. In a way it is a good job that the left did not come to power, because it had no plans, no politics, no strategy and definitely no theory about what to do.

The oil workers were crucial in the February revolution. It was their strikes that broke the back of the shah’s regime. The Fadai had some influence among them, but they were hampered by their lack of experience of working with the class. There was no plan about what to do with the strike, how to move it forward. Inevitably, the Tudeh Party, which did have a base in the working class, was better represented among the oil workers.

Many tendencies in the European and American left, have argued that in February 1979 we were looking at a situation of ‘dual power’ in Iran, while others have disagreed. The truth is that the Islamists were powerful before the uprising and their coming to power was inevitable. They had faced far less repression under the shah than the left had endured. Meetings in mosques and other religious institutions were tolerated by the regime and the Islamists were much better off financially, benefiting from donations from the bazaar.

In stark contrast, the left and other secular forces were hampered by being the last to be released from prison. Perhaps this disadvantage could have been overcome, but the left then crippled itself with its strategic confusion and a myriad of tactical mistakes that allowed the Islamists to outmanoeuvre them.

An interview we are also publishing with Mohammad Reza Shalgouni, founder-member of the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran (Rahe Kargar), gives us a valuable insight into the thinking of leftwing activists and prisoners released just before the uprising.

1979 Iranian revolution

The uprising was a direct result of the failures of the shah’s regime to respond to the economic crisis that followed the economic boom of the early 1970s. Most skilled workers faced a drop in their living standards in 1976. The ‘White Revolution’ in agriculture rendered huge numbers of peasants landless, forcing them to seek seasonal jobs in major cities. Recession in the Iranian economy left them unemployed and destitute in shanty towns.

Additionally, the small independent producers had been forced out of business (bankrupted) by the decision of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce to shore-up the already privileged position of big capitalists. Corruption and the rule of a clique around the royal court meant that many traditional merchants, often associated with the bazaar, were deprived of the large profits available to the better connected sections of the ruling class. Such decisions, exemplifying the arrogant dictatorship of the royal family, fuelled widespread political discontent. In the absence of any financial support for the peasantry, the shah’s ‘land reform’ had impoverished the countryside, while the massive exodus to the big cities created sprawling shanty towns.

Two parallel universes existed – not just in income and standards of living, but also in terms of culture. The secular upper classes in north Tehran looked down on the poor and even the lower middle class. The term chadori (the long cloak worn by religious women) was used by westernised, upper-class woman in a derogatory manner. In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, certain forms of “cultural capital” were valued over and above others – they helped or hindered social mobility just as much as income or wealth.

Far from being a “conspiracy by the west to depose the shah because of his growing power”, as one commentator put it, the uprising was a direct result of the failures of the shah’s regime to respond to the economic crisis that followed the boom of the early 1970s.

The clergy had made compromises with the regime, which allowed it to survive the repressive measures of the shah’s dictatorship. Thus, it was in a much better position to benefit from political discontent than secular and socialist groups, which had lost many in their ranks through execution and imprisonment. In the summer of 1978, religious demonstrations in major cities were led by the clergy, financed by the bazaar and supported by independent producers, the urban poor and students.

Contrary to the kind of analysis proposed by many on the left outside Iran, the division within the Iranian movement was not simply between reformists and revolutionaries. Nor was it between Stalinists and anti-Stalinists and it did not centre on the classic issue of ‘stages’ of revolution, bourgeois or socialist. Rather the issue of division was the supposed existence of a ‘socialist camp’ led by the Soviet Union and the extent to which the politics of ‘third world’ regimes were judged by their anti-US rhetoric.

After the revolution, as protests against inequality and for better wages and working conditions continued in factories and throughout the oil industry, the new Islamic government attacked protestors and labour activists. Defence of private property became paramount for the regime, whose main pillars of support were based in the bazaar and amongst small capitalists.

In addition, the non-homogeneous (multi-class) mix in the Islamists’ camp necessitated a policy of denying class struggle – or at least marginalising it and removing it from the political agenda. This social bloc, united under the umbrella of religious culture, had no other way of surmounting the class antagonisms within itself between the impoverished shanty-town dwellers and the much better-off bazaaris.

The suppression of leftwing and all secular opposition during the shah’s time allowed sections of the clergy and the Islamic movement to mobilise class discontent using the language of religion. The clergy was in a much better position to benefit from political discontent than secular, socialist groups, which had lost so many cadres.

Contemporarily, the workers’ movement was taking shape. Councils (shoras) were formed in major industries, where workers were organising strikes and go-slows, initially around economic demands. However, the workers gradually became more political – for example, with demands for the expulsion of agents of the secret police (Savak) from the factories.

This movement, although supported by various left groups, had no clear leadership and remained subordinate to the Islamist movement. Some of the most important shoras were formed in Khouzestan province in the oil and steel industries, where major strikes shook the regime in the latter part of 1978 and early 79. However, these shoras never became nationwide working class forums, although at times they took up political slogans.

Conspiracy theories

Royalists and similar opponents of the Islamic Republic have peddled various conspiracy theories about US general Robert Huyser’s secret mission of January 1979. However, the published documents show the confusion emanating from the administration of president Jimmy Carter, which was trying to manage events thousands of miles away, in circumstances where it had failed to understand the reasons behind mass protests against its favourite Middle Eastern tyrant.

One of Huyser’s main tasks was to encourage the shah to leave the country and to stop a potential military coup by top generals. According to BBC World Service journalist Kambiz Fattahi, who has studied the state department’s declassified documents, 10 days after the shah’s departure, Khomeini sent a message to Washington offering a deal: if Carter could use his influence on the military to clear the way for his takeover, Khomeini suggested, he would calm the nation. Stability could be restored, while America’s interests and citizens in Iran would be protected.²

Khomeini’s note to the president was declassified in 2016, but it was only in 2019, on the 40th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, that comments and analysis of it became well known – shedding more light on the Carter administration’s secret negotiations immediately after the shah’s flight from Tehran. While Huyser’s main mission was to stop pro-shah generals from organising a military coup, he had in fact given the generals the green light for such a coup if the left was in a position to take power. The secret deal demonstrates that the US administration was more fearful of the left than the Islamists – particularly the working class, whose strikes had paralysed the country. In the true tradition of US foreign intervention, not least during the cold war, it was better to ally with the Islamists against secular and leftwing forces.

The plan agreed between the Carter administration and Khomeini (via his secular advisors) was to organise a smooth transfer of power to his regime. What shattered those plans was the involvement of the homafar (technicians and junior flight crew) in the Iranian airforce, who took up arms against their commanders in support of the Organisation of Iranian People’s Guerrillas on February 11-12. In those last days of the ancien régime, in Tehran and in other cities across the country there were violent clashes between revolutionaries and the shah’s supporters. The military imposed a curfew, but most Iranians ignored it. Supporters of leftwing revolutionary groups occupied parliament, the television broadcaster and other state-run institutions.

The coincidence of the pro-Fadai demonstration celebrating the anniversary of the Siahkal operation (February 10 1979) with the battle between the Imperial Guard and the homafar, which had begun on the night of February 9, allowed the Fadai cadres, as well as hundreds, or maybe thousands, of their supporters, to play a decisive role in the armed uprising that led to the downfall of the monarchy on February 11 1979. This was an uprising for which the leaders of the revolution were not prepared at all, but they were quick to act. On February 11 the end of the monarchy was announced.

The Organisation of Iranian Peoples Fadai Guerrillas (OIPFG) took over Savak’s headquarters in north Tehran. Suddenly the organisation had tens of thousands of supporters, many from the middle and upper classes. In February 1979 in Tehran it had become fashionable to be a supporter of the modernist Marxist Fadai organisation, as opposed to the obscurantist clerics. The OIPFG boycotted the referendum that installed the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 1979 – a move very popular with their supporters.

The first rally called by the Fadai in Tehran in 1979 after the overthrow of the shah attracted 500,000 people. Despite reservations, they stood in the elections to what was a sort of constituent assembly and got a couple of million votes.

In the second part of this article I will look at the role of the left after the revolution.

First published as a supplement in the Weekly Worker: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1333/supplement-preparing-for-revolution/

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1. E Abrahamian A history of modern Iran Cambridge 2008, p122.↩︎

2. bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-36431160.↩︎

Mohamad Reza Shalgouni was a founder-member of the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran (Rahe Kargar). He spoke to Yassamine Mather about his strategic reassessment as a prisoner of the shah and experience of the revolutionary years of 1978-79

How long were you a prisoner during the shah’s reign?

I was in prison from January 1970 to November 1978. I was charged with being a member of the ‘Palestine Group’ and sentenced to 10 years in prison. And I was also arrested in early 1968 for student political activities and spent four months in prison, but without an official conviction.

When did you change your opinion on armed struggle?

I had doubts about the efficacy of armed struggle from 1972, but it was in 1975 that I became certain on the matter. Through discussions I’d had with some inmate friends in Evin prison – who belonged to different groups and all believed in armed struggle – we reached the conclusion that, separate from the masses, it cannot be successful.

Considering your knowledge and understanding of the subject today, how do you evaluate the armed struggles during the shah’s reign? And if you are critical about it, what other tactics would have been effective in your opinion?

The armed struggle, which began on February 8 1972, was without doubt a turning point in the fight against the shah’s dictatorship and made the people’s confrontation with the shah’s regime all the more clear, and helped take it to a new level. But that struggle did not widen and even started to fade after 1974.

This failure had evident reasons behind it: First, participation in the armed struggle was so costly that only a very small number of political fighters were willing to engage in it. Let’s not forget that the late Masoud Ahmadzadeh had noted that the fighting life of a guerrilla can only be six months. It is only natural that when a movement is unable to replace a fallen or arrested fighter with two, it will cease to move forwards. In prison, we witnessed that those who were arrested after 1974 were less experienced and even younger than before, with little political knowledge.

Second, every successful political fighter must be able to evoke economic, social and intellectual struggles as well – otherwise, they will not be connected with the people. No-one becomes involved in political struggles through mere abstract concepts. It is through tangible and distinctive economic, social, intellectual and cultural struggles and demands that one enters the political sphere. During that period in Iran which saw the start of the armed struggles, the shah’s dictatorship established an incredibly strict security environment, where even non-political activities were difficult to carry out. And therefore the atmosphere of oppression was unprecedentedly intensified in those years.

Third, even though the idea of armed struggle was developed and spread by leftwing activists, this movement (as I mentioned before) was not successful in connecting and blending with the left’s social base: the labourers, manual workers and the poor. It only spread and stayed among the middle class, which restricted the armed struggle to opposing dictatorship, without encompassing any strong or specific concept of the social classes. The consequences of this restriction became more apparent after the revolution. We must keep in mind that urban armed struggles – specifically long ones – disrupt the organisation of the labourers. This is a well-known matter in the Marxist movement, which many (including Lenin in his ‘Guerrilla warfare’ article, published in 1906) have pointed out.

To answer your question about other effective tactics, I believe that more attention should have been paid to the problems and issues of the lower class, and the demands and struggles of the labourers and workers should have been organised. It should not be forgotten that in the 15-year period before the revolution, the urban population of Iran doubled, as the majority of villagers moved to the cities, constituting the helpless populations on the outskirts of cities, and later on played an important role in igniting the flames of the 1979 revolution. They became a major part of the clergy’s forces, led by Ruhollah Khomeini during the revolution.

Since you were in prison throughout 1978-79, could you tell us the extent you were aware of protests against the shah’s regime, and how you evaluated these protests?

The truth is that after Jimmy Carter’s victory in the US election there was a significant change of atmosphere in the political prisons of the shah’s regime. For instance, we, the prisoners in Evin (the prison most directly under the supervision of the Savak secret police at the time), witnessed a sudden reduction of pressure: there was more recreation time in the yard, the quality of food improved, and family visits were gradually allowed.

In early 1977, the shah allowed representatives of the Red Cross to visit Iran’s political prisons and speak with the prisoners directly. This visit was truly unprecedented and speaking with them gave us the opportunity to expose many of the regime’s crimes, their systems of torture and political assassinations. It was after the arrival of Red Cross representatives that our visitors were allowed to bring us books, which were given to us without the former controls and inspections. And it was at that time that our knowledge of the country’s affairs increased considerably, both through receiving newspapers and also the news that was delivered to us by our visitors. I remember that even some foreign magazines such as Le Monde Diplomatique, The Guardian Weekly and Newsweek were brought to us by the visitors at that time and hence we were able to find out about the commotion going on in the country. The inmates jokingly called this change of environment ‘Jimocracy’.

As you know, after the uprising of February 1978 in Tabriz, the protests entered a new stage and I remember that inmates turned the Nowruz (Iranian new year) of 1979 into a real celebration. And from the beginning of the new year, with the expansion of protests and memorials and Chehelloms (the 40th day of mourning the deceased in Iran) of victims in various cities, the majority of political prisoners believed that the regime could no longer return to its previous state. By the end of spring 1979, our circle in the Evin prison (which became one of the founding groups of Workers Way) concluded that the country was heading at full speed towards a ‘state of revolution’. We formulated our reasons for this evaluation in a small pamphlet and handed it out to our trusted friends in the prison.

Did your assessment of the protests change when you were released from prison?

Yes. After being released, our assessment definitely changed. When we were out, we realised that the influence of the clergy was much greater than we had anticipated. In the mid-autumn of 1978, you could see the influence of Khomeini’s supporters increase rapidly among people, and it was then that we (the groups that would later form Workers Way) grew more concerned about the regime that might replace the shah’s.

How did you assess the position of the radical left towards these protests, and has this assessment changed?

Before the uprising of February 1979, almost all leftwing parties supported people’s protests and participated actively in them. I can’t remember a single leftist group being opposed to the mass protests at that time. The truth is that, due to the oppressive environment that was created, especially in the last 15 years, the shah’s regime had practically no active supporters.

Do you evaluate the tactics of your group at that time as positive?

Before the victory of the uprising in February, there was no organisation called Workers Way. Its definitive formation as an independent group took place in the summer of 1978, and its core members were mostly prisoners who were released during the revolution. Most of them did not want to form such a group initially and mainly participated in the protests, along with the Organisation of People’s Fadai (Majority), during the uprising.

In the days following the uprising, our relationship and negotiations with the leader of the Fadai took a more orderly and regular form. But the leader’s confusion while evaluating Khomeini and the clergy told us that we could not cooperate with that organisation and inevitably had to organise ourselves as an independent group.

I must note that the first issue of Workers Way was published after the US embassy was occupied by Muslim students, followers of the imam’s line. Of course, we believed that the clerical government would be a reactionary and oppressive one for sure, and, once established, it would be a ruthless, fascist regime. We formulated this assessment in March 1979 in a pamphlet titled On perspectives. And, even though it was not widely distributed, one was given to the leader of the Fadai organisation, which unfortunately elicited a very upset reaction, since many of them – including some comrades who would later on lead the Organisation of People’s Fadai (Minority) – were still optimistic towards a regime led by Khomeini, and their view was reinforced after the occupation of the US embassy.

In your opinion, did we ever face a situation of dual power?

I think that after September 8 1978 a dual power was practically formed in the country. Of course, the situation wasn’t the same in every city and after the shah left on January 16 1979, the dual power situation was established and the uprising reached its peak in February.

How do you assess the reasons behind the religious groups’ success in organising the protests?

The religious groups’ ability to organise people, especially the lower classes, was greater than that of left and other groups.

First, contrary to popular belief, the Shi’ite clergy was never completely under the control of governments, even during the Safavid dynasty. Since believing in the reign of the 12 infallible imams is one of the principles of the Shi’ite religion, during the period of ‘absence’ (of the 12th imam) the Shi’ite clerics considered themselves ‘deputy imams’ and therefore they would avoid integration into the government of the sultans and shahs in various ways.

During the reign of Reza Shah and especially with the start of his authoritarian ‘modernisation’, there was a clear gap between the monarchy and the clergy. This gap was significantly narrowed in the first 12-year period of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule (September 1941 to August 1953) as a result of the expanding influence of the left and the oil nationalisation movement led by Mosaddegh; therefore, a sort of alliance was formed between the monarchy and the clergy. However, with the shah’s announcement of the ‘White Revolution’ in the winter of 1963, the gap widened once more, and on June 6 1963 it resulted in a bloody confrontation between the government and that part of the clergy led by Khomeini. With the rise of Khomeini as the main opponent of the shah’s ‘reforms’, a powerful political current was formed against the shah’s dictatorship, which continued its activities semi-secretly on a mass scale, under the guise of religious ceremonies.

Second, Khomeini was clever about presenting his completely reactionary ideas under the guise of countering American influence and defending the country’s independence, while refusing to give any concessions to progressive groups. Thus, he formed a practical alliance with the strong anti-imperialist opposition groups in Iran (which were widespread after the coup d’état of August 19 1953).

It should not be forgotten that Khomeini’s tricks stemmed from his reactionary fundamentalism: the belief in the irreconcilability of Islam with western culture. In any case, that is how the clergy following Khomeini was able to carry on with its utterly retrogressive policies, under the guise of opposing dictatorship and defending the country’s independence – which also weakened the progressive anti-imperialist currents in Iran’s politics.

Third, while the shah’s government did not allow any independent political parties to operate and suppressed every one in the last 15 years of his reign (any tendency towards the left was nipped in the bud due to anti-left paranoia). By contrast religion was seen as the biggest support of the government. But under the cover of the same religious apparatus, the shah’s religious opponents were able to organise themselves and even establish private schools to train their followers.

Fourth, as I mentioned before, in the 15-year period before the revolution, unprecedented internal immigration took place and the urban population more than doubled as a result of the shah’s land reforms and increased oil revenues. A large number of these people who had left their villages constituted helpless populations in the outskirts of the cities and played an important role in igniting the 1979 revolution. Their everyday struggle for survival fused with religious ideas and they became the clergy’s main strike force during the revolution. Suffice to say, at the beginning of the 1970s there were 30,000 active religious groups in Tehran alone and the highest print circulation belonged to a prayer book called Mafatih Al Jinan (over one million copies), while there were no more than 3,000 copies of Ahmad Shamloo’s poetry books – the most popular in our literature.

Were the clergy less oppressed compared to the left during Pahlavi’s rule, and was there a large gap between the common people and the guerrillas?

The oppression of the religious currents was basically non-existent, compared to that of the political currents – and especially the leftwing groups. Before the arrest of People’s Mujahedin Organisation activists (who in fact distanced themselves from the traditionally religious and were in practice considered part of the left by the shah’s regime, which even called them ‘Islamic Marxists’ at times), the religious prisoners in the shah’s prison were very few in number. Moreover, the arrest of some religious individuals or groups did not mean that the religious apparatus was prohibited from being active by any means and, as I mentioned before, many of the political/religious activists were able to continue their activities under the guise of religious ceremonies and rituals. And, on the other hand, armed struggle certainly limited, or even blocked, any means of communication between the common people and the guerrillas.

In your opinion, which social classes supported the armed struggle movement and the People’s Fadai Organisation?

I think in the era of oppression the shah’s regime created, most people admired a guerrilla who dared to stand up to it. Under those circumstances, the action of each guerrilla was truly epic and heroic. But, for this very reason, people were afraid of taking the same path. However, for political resistance to spread among the masses the gap between the fighters and the ordinary people should not be wide. To be more exact, the valiant heroes should offer the people a path that does not cost them gravely in the end.

For this very reason, when circumstances changed during the revolution (mid-1978, for instance) and the per capita cost and danger of participating in the protests was lowered for the people, we witnessed the People’s Fadai become a truly mass organisation (one could even call them the largest political opposition), which demonstrated the fact that people were truly supportive of it. Of course, we shouldn’t forget that even at that time, the active supporters of the Fadai organisation mainly came from the middle class and not the lower class (with whom communication should have been a priority for the left).

Did the radical left have supporters among the working class?

The radical left had a significant number of advocates among workers, for sure. However, first, these supporters were more significant among the workers who were aware of class conflicts. Second, it was only with the prevalence of the mass struggles and the decreasing of the cost of participation in movements that the radical left supporters began to increase among the working class. And, third, the increase in radical left advocates among the working class was only accelerated with the commencement of economic and social struggles, since the labourers can only enter the political arena on a mass scale through these economic and social movements.

How did this support affect significant days, such as February 11 1979, when the shah’s regime finally fell?

Studying their actions at that time leaves us no doubt that the workers will support the radical left mainly by organising economic and social struggles. We witnessed labourers accompanying and supporting the radical left through forming workers’ councils and going on strike, and it was in these areas and movements that the power of the left was more clear and visible, compared to Khomeini’s supporters, on the streets. The power of the left was so significant in the workplaces that the clergy which had just come to power had to make concessions to their leftwing rivals.

First published as a supplement in the Weekly Worker: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1333/supplement-limits-of-guerrillaism/

Feelings of injustice, a lack of rights and a sense of betrayal have become universal and act as psychological and subjective drivers of protest, writes Ardeshir Mehrdad. But how can protest be forged into a movement than can topple the regime?

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Iranian society has witnessed successive waves of protest. One could argue that it has been in a perpetual state of ‘insurrection’.

Over these three decades, it is possible to identify three long waves that are linked through a chain of mass protest movements, large- or small-scale, whether political, work-related or social.

1. May 1992 – April 1995

Over this time, there were about 10 protests of various sizes in different towns or cities. The social base for them was the underprivileged and deprived urban masses (the lowest layers of the working class with the greatest fragility to change). This is the underclass that had nothing to lose and was to pay the price of starting a fire. The main body of the population motivated to protest was made up of segments of the working class – without a clear strategy, tactics, programme and demands, and lacking a clear class presence. In this period, with the exception of the protests in Qazvin, one could not really identify any significant participation of the middle class.

These protests took place against the background of mounting discontent of varying degrees and intensity that one can sum up as inequality and deprivation. At the heart of it is class inequality, imposed by economic, police and ideological determinates.

The immediate stimulus was the collapse of living standards, brought about by the shocks of the structural adjustment policies imposed on the country by the government of president Hashemi Rafsanjani – the main aim of which was a redistribution of wealth and incomes, resulting in widening class divisions and inequalities.

The protests began in opposition to these policies and were defensive in nature, but they quickly acquired political dimensions and became more radicalised. Typically, they began with particular motives, but rapidly morphed into protests against the political system, questioning its legitimacy. The inner versatility of these protests meant that any struggle for survival or any attempt to absorb them into the system rapidly turned into a struggle for change and a leap towards political demands.

These spontaneous movements were mobilised and led principally through their own inner organic development. What crystallised the individual and atomised elements of this mass and connected them was their immediate identity: the identity of the class unit rising out of their objective conditions. Neither political parties, trade organisations nor civil groups played any role in their mobilisation or organisation. Such groupings as workers, teachers, nurses, women, students, lawyers or writers not only did not take a lead, they scarcely gave support.

The geography of these movements was predominantly in the outskirts of cities and satellite towns – places where there was a widening gap between the needs of the people and the demands of the system of power and wealth, and where inequality was more palpable.

These protests had a high potential for reciprocal violence in response to repression. Yet, despite the use of violence, we were not witness to a blind revolt but to movements with a relatively clear political logic and which targeted the centres and representatives of power, wealth and inequality for attack and destruction.

These movements took place under a total information blackout and lacked any ability for independently disseminating news themselves. Meanwhile, the official media kept their silence, even after the suppression of these uprisings. Any rare mention was a distorted version of what happened put out by the security and intelligence agencies.

This wave was restrained by bloody crackdowns – in the city of Eslamshahr alone more than 50 people were shot dead from a helicopter, with hundreds injured and thousands detained.

2. July 1999 – June 2009

Two huge protests movements occurred at either end of this decade.

In July 1999, when students at Tehran and Tabriz universities protested against the closure of the reformist daily Salam, the police responded with an assault on student dormitories; and in June 2009 we witnessed widespread protests at the rigged presidential elections in Tehran, as well as many other urban centres. The 2009 protest continued longer than all previous such movements since the 1979 revolution, lasting until the end of December. Official reports speak of 37 people killed in Tehran alone, with hundreds wounded and 300 arrested.

The movements of this second wave differed from previous unrest in terms of social base, initial provocation, sources of mobilisation and geography. The middle class formed their main social body, and protests circled around civil and political rights directed at the core of political power. The presence of the more deprived urban masses and those living at its periphery was difficult to detect.

At their birth and in their early spread, these movements had a centralised leadership and were mobilised in an organised way. Moreover, by placing themselves within the cracks in the ruling power blocs, they gained a certain mantel of security. The political line behind them was reform of the political structure, and their predominant tactics were those of civil disobedience.

Unlike the first wave, these protests benefited from extensive media coverage and had at their disposal effective levers of communication.

But ultimately brutal repression radicalised these movements both politically and tactically. The popular movement increasingly distanced itself from its leaders and the leadership slowly passed to its base. Finally, mass action ended in mutual violence and a movement for political reform morphed into a movement for radical political change.

3. December-January 2017-18 and October-November 2019

The third wave was in many ways a return to the protests of the early 90s. The groundwork for these two great uprisings was laid in a large number of small and mass protests and movements that took place in the early 2010s:

• Neishapour: July 2012 against rising prices.
• Tehran: October 2012 strike and protest by Bazaar workers.
• Urumieh: July 2012 strike and demonstration against the drying up of Lake Urumieh.
• Tabriz: July 2012 strike.
• Tehran: March 2013 demonstrations against rising prices.
• Tehran (and a number of other towns): October 2012 protest at the house arrest of reformist leader Mehdi Karrubi.
• the region of Varzaneh: October 2012 protest by farmers.
• Nahavand: August 2012 protest at the rise in the price of electricity and bread.

In addition there were dozens of other protests of various sizes. These experiences, by augmenting one another, acted as a dress rehearsal for the uprisings of 2018 and 2019.

The material basis for these movements was the economic crisis that escalated from a crisis of reproduction into a crisis of actual survival amongst a large section of society. The rapid and horrendous collapse of the living conditions of the working class and various strata of the lower classes, alongside the rapid decline of the middle layers of society into poverty, widened the political gap between capital and labour to an unprecedented level.

Thus, the most dispossessed sections of the labour force made up the main bulk of the protests, atomised but a multitude, while the presence of the middle class was less apparent. The leadership remained internal and spontaneous, but, compared to the first wave, we could observe a greater ability to be swayed by outside factors. The movement spread across areas with greater deprivation and those forced into greater inequality.

But several important differences distinguish this wave from the first:

1. There was a substantial development in the use of media, including social media, for information and communication, and for mobilising and organising. The internet, satellites, smartphones and social media networks provided new communication tools. At the same time, TV networks abroad (with huge financial support from the US and Saudi governments) and with a wide and popular coverage, became active and not only ended the news blockade concerning such movements, but also played an important role in coordinating the sporadic demonstrations. Aided by these facilities, it became difficult, if not impossible, to disrupt communication between the various centres of protest and there was greater coordination.
2. There was also a qualitative change in the extent and spread of protests, which now grew from tens to hundreds of neighbourhoods and town districts (in one estimate they affected up to 500 different locations in 2019) and brought millions out into the streets.
3. In comparison to three decades previously, there was a significantly greater presence of unemployed youth within the crowds, allowing the emergence of an organic leadership from within these movements that was qualitatively much better than before and permitting a greater tactical creativity in confronting the apparatus of repression.

Right from the beginning, the uprisings had a radical political focus and almost immediately each grouping challenged the main centres of power. While it is true that the dominant discourse was a rejection of the existing political order, there was also a ‘negation’: here and there one could observe transient and fleeting veins of a number of more ‘affirmative’ views, which shows that sections of this population are open to being influenced by propaganda coming from outside the country and have the possibility of being canalised by the network of satellite televisions being beamed from outside.

Over the last three decades a large part of state resources in Iran have been spent on strengthening the arms of repression, and the military and security apparatus. These are now equipped with the latest technologies, their internal organisation are constantly reviewed and improved, their institutional make-up revised, their personnel expanded, their equipment and training constantly updated. Regular manoeuvres ensure their preparedness for future unrest, yet the severity and extent of the latest uprising took them by surprise, such that in some areas they lost control for a time and could not regain it without bringing into play virtually their entire repertoire of repression and even real urban warfare, to finally rein in the uprisings.

Roots of revolt

A mixture of political, economic, social and cultural issues fan inequality, discrimination and structural corruption. This is what lies at the roots of widespread discontent. Feelings of injustice, lack of rights and a sense of betrayal have become universal and act as psychological and subjective drivers of protest.

Iranian society is in an explosive condition, any social, political or economic problem has the potential to rapidly escalate into social protest, revolt and ultimately into acute crisis.

Under such conditions, any independent and direct group action – regardless of motive, aims or demand, and whatever political course it takes or tactics it adopts – comes into inevitable conflict with the ruling political order and ends up by resorting to violence and rebellion. The reasons for this are clear.

The country has reached an impasse. With the economic crisis seemingly endless, with the prospect of any improvement in the living conditions of millions bleak, the political structure is in total paralysis. There is no possible opening for freely expressing discontent; there are no legal, institutional or official means to protest against policies and actions. In a situation where official means of participation in changing and reforming conditions are closed off, some form of revolt would appear inevitable.

At the social level, the accumulation of discontent caused by inequality, along with sexual, ethnic, national, religious and linguistic discrimination, can no longer be reined in. The contrast between official cultural principles, standards, values and behaviour with the changes that have taken place in the cultural and intellectual developments of society has become critical. This has forced the rulers to resort to the only tool at their disposal: the use of repression and naked force. This merely inflames the discontent of women, youth, ethnic and national groups and other minorities, and has exacerbated the existing social tensions and added to the rebellious potential within society.

At the structural level, the absence of significant workers’ organisations and of wide-ranging social organisations makes it difficult to mould mass social movements in an organised way and helps confine protests, keeping them separate from one another. The constantly swelling unemployed population is faced with diminishing prospects of finding any fixed employment. For those with no job the medium of protest is predictably channelled towards gathering in open spaces, the occupation of streets and confrontation with anti-riot police (note that the ability to organise in any form of trade or vocational union faces serious obstacles).

In such a situation, while protests can be reined in, they cannot be stopped. The sea remains turbulent: one wave may subside, but another is on its way.

Prospects

What I have enumerated above are not hypotheses, but self-evident in the uprisings of the last three decades.

But many questions remain: the dialectic of individual and group struggle, small-scale and large; the street, neighbourhood and national, union-based and political, workplace and living-space, resources for mobilisation and for organising political opportunities; the degree of ability to be influenced and transformed, the degree and capability to influence and effect change; and finally the prospects for future such waves.

In the present discussion, with the assumption that there is no end to these waves, I will concentrate on one of these questions: what are the prospects facing the next wave of popular movements?

I think it is most useful to see this broad uprising not as a phenomenon, but a process – an entity in the process of ‘becoming’; a space between fear and hope. It is flexible, and is affected by permanent struggles between heterogeneous and at times incompatible interests. It oscillates between those forces and motivations that propel it forwards and those that impede its progress. Wherever and whenever it begins, the end is not necessarily preordained. Its direction and prospects are dependent on the changeable balance of inner forces, and the effects of shifting external conditions, and ultimately dependent on the interaction between objective and subjective elements.

These issues apply particularly to the type of uprisings that took place in the third wave (2018-19) – those which took place on a horizontal structure, the foundation of which was based on large and small circles and centres, and grew like creeping roots that can spread in any direction and at times multiply with particular rapidity. This is a model of arrival and expansion, with self-governing units, and relations that neither follow a given hierarchy nor necessarily are under a unified hegemony or leadership. In such a structure (at least at its inception and early growth) there is neither a single and inflexible direction, nor can we expect a unified or unchanging set of slogans, demands or conduct.

The protests of the last years have been full of potential and limitations, strengths and weaknesses, with much to consider, particularly about their potential. In the same way, the prospects for future uprisings, if they are not crushed, can depend on a wide spectrum of different players with a broad range of roles. These could range from being merely an instrument helping one or other faction haggle for some changes in the existing structure of power, though ultimately saving the system, to even falling into the trap of being swallowed up and integrated into it. They could range from succumbing to a role of being canalised to becoming a tool for the interests of global powers; succumbing to fulfilling a proxy role for this or that power; falling into a futile cycle of unlinked and separated actions that are set aflame briefly and fizzle out; or finally taking a leap towards being an effector for a historic transition towards freedom and equality.

With such a diverse trajectory, to refute or reject these movements is as indefensible as premature fascination and exaggeration in giving it a positive sheen and assigning it a clear perspective.

In the framework of the multiple potential outlooks that I have outlined, I would like to pose this question: is there a realistic possibility that a future protest uprising can turn itself into a movement of political and structural transformation? The answer, in brief, is both yes and no! Yes, only if it can overcome its weaknesses, limitations and impediments; and no if not – and both are possible.

Preconditions

To unravel these, we need to consider a large series of complex interactions of inter-dependent variables. For the sake of clarity and to facilitate analysis we could classify these variables under four separate preconditions.

1.Sustainability: the ability to avoid being reined in. Popular movements can go beyond repeating the mistakes of the past, not fizzle out after an explosion of anger, and not act solely as a psychological safety valve, ending up as just another entry in the record of popular struggles – yet another experience of defeat, with all its negative psychological and political effects.

The great challenge facing the movement here is the sum total of all the resources that have to date been assembled to crush popular struggles and the means to resist them.

2.Organisability: reaching a certain level of internal cohesion and class solidarity. That means the body of the mass movement is fortified by a certain level of organisation that can provide action to prevent dispersions and internal divisions with a certain degree of inner cohesion and solidarity.

To understand the importance of this precondition, one need only to look at the class content of the movements, particularly after 2012. Here, not only were their main sections devoid of cohesion and organisation, but their various groups suffered seriously from the absence of necessary bonds. In this makeup, the shapeless mass of the urban destitute occupy a particularly central role.

This section is waiting for a political opportunity to return to the street. With three decades of experience in a route full of the ups and downs of trial and error, it has slowly trained cadres and achieved an important level of communications. Its disparate sections have, with the help of both the regular media and of social networks, created a level of communication, albeit unstable and disjointed, between its elements. The events of these three decades have provided it with a store of practical and tactical knowledge. More importantly the forces directing it continue to be fed by their material and social foundations. One can infer that the movements of this sector will not be easily diverted or crushed.

Moreover, the urban destitute contains a section that has until now been passive, but can potentially be activated – changing the balance of power in favour of achieving structural transformation. But this sector remains atomised, dispersed and unorganised, leading to the question: how can this problem be overcome, and a way found to mobilise and interconnectedly organise its inner elements? A question that has tens of other questions in its train.

• What different layers, sectors and groups of society constitute this shapeless mass?
• What are their individual, specific demands?
• How does one organise each group around these specific demands and simultaneously link them in a wider network? And by what means and mechanism?
• What are the shared interests among the layers, sectors and groups of the urban destitute? In what shape and around what needs and demands can this disparate mass be mobilised in a broad circle in solidarity with one another?

The other important issue is the more advanced and progressive labour force. Over the past decades, this force has never let go and at no time has remained passive against the worsening of punitive economic conditions. The struggles of workers, teachers, nurses, the retired and others in recent years bear witness to this. In current conditions, a wide-ranging and more determined presence by these sectors in the political arena of the country, and the augmenting of their influence over the other sectors, is a real possibility. Yet a large section of existing organisations in this sector have been unable to connect fully with their base and mobilise those passive and inactive sectors. A large part of the potential of this sector remains untapped, and we are only seeing the embryonic horizontal extension of its potential.

Even now, this sector has no significant leadership or mobilising role, and its distinct presence is barely noticeable. This raises the question of how the gulf between the protests of this section and the street protests of the mass of the urban destitute can be bridged. What are the paths to creating solidarity and coordination between these two movements into some form of integration? Can this sector fill the gap of a centralised leadership in the spontaneous urban protest movements?

The role of the middle classes and strata in future political developments and movements is undeniable. Although, under the influence of the acute economic crisis, this section is rapidly splitting, and a significant part has sunk into poverty and destitution in the last decade, this development does not necessarily mean the end to the irresolution, both political and intellectual, of this class. Neither does it necessarily mean that in the class struggle they can directly enhance the movement potential of the working class.

Over the past decade, these middle layers have been radicalised politically, but what shape might their turn towards a full confrontation with the established order take? And what proactive role will they adopt? What tendencies have the potential to grow among them? Will they take part directly in a broad popular movement from below to create a better and more humane society? Or will they rely on intervention by foreign powers and promote this view among the masses of the deprived in order to achieve a developing ‘secular’ capitalism? Or will they even turn to the military and endorse some form of restructuring of the present system?

These days the price of participation in protest is large, and the more affluent sectors of the middle class, who have more to lose, are less inclined to participate. However, in conditions where there is a possibility of participation with lower risks, this sector could have a very strong presence and with it a possible decisive effect on the political direction, demands and general slogans of that movement.

3. Untapped resources of the working class: how can they be activated to bring workers centre-stage and unearth their enormous potential?

The issue here is the mobilisation of the labour force both horizontally and vertically, such that the inactive sectors of the working class at every level are brought into the class struggle. The question becomes what specific demands can effectively mobilise and what approach can be effective in rousing these passive elements.

4. Raising class-consciousness: how to overcome ideological straitjackets and political illusions? The failure to do so can open the way for protest movements being either absorbed into the existing political structure or channelled into pathways favourable to imperialist powers – or for different factions within the regime to use the discontent of the deprived masses to their advantage.

Overcoming the danger of absorption into the existing political structure is as vital as overcoming of suppression of the movement. When hungry and fleeced people protest in utter desperation, their sworn enemies also line up to try and get something for themselves. They attempt to shrewdly enter through the cracks in people’s perceptions and fuel misconceptions.

For a while, a group whose only speciality is exploitation can appear side by side with their erstwhile victims – only to ride the popular movement of the destitute to their own advantage, the moment they spot an opening. From their viewpoint the people who have revolted are flocks waiting for a shepherd. There is no shortage here. Neither their past actions, nor their social grouping, political past, ideology or past ethical behaviour matters: all that is necessary is skill in deception. Some appeal to imperialist powers, while others are internal factions within the country – several of the offspring of the Pahlavi kings are skilled in this. All they need is a few chests of money, one or two 24-hour television networks and a handful of political middlemen and lackeys.

Solidarity

Finally, I will now speculate on ways of achieving the first precondition: that is, assuring its sustainability and its ability to combat the suppression of the movement.

It is clear that, for a government that has reached a dead end and is no longer able to rely on ‘reform’ to continue its control of society, a recourse to naked repression becomes its main tool. As the crisis deepens and conditions worsen, the propaganda that accompanies it is fanning fear for the future: the fear of falling into the fate of Libya, Yemen, Iraq or Syria; or a break-up of the country and other horizons that are in reality ways of diverting attention from the structural logjam.

In order to confront the threat to crush the popular movement, the most important way is increasing the cost of doing so, so that the forces of the state hesitate to resort to repression: altering the pros and cons in such a way that the cost of reining in the protests becomes heavier and heavier. Parallel to this it is important to neutralise the effects of psychological pressures, and indeed to turn back the direction of these pressures towards the force of repression. Here there exist countless mechanisms – particularly the creative use of the means of communication – to confuse, weaken and cause cracks in the main body of the machinery of repression.

The very fact of resistance has a huge potential for stirring and mobilising protests. In reality, many of the skirmishes and movements that today are scattered actions belong to this category and can act as models for a much broader and more persistent movement. There have been many such examples globally.

Creating variety in the method, terrain and shape of protest is equally essential. Here uniting movements in the street and beyond, with those in the workplace closely coordinated with struggles at the neighbourhood level, are essential. Similarly, if the relatively costly group struggles can be combined with less costly individual acts, then there are few individuals or groups among the mass of workers and toilers who could not participate according to their own ability, and find a role for themselves in this struggle.

Protest movements that employ only limited forms – limited by geography or method – can easily be harnessed. If a protesting people cannot doggedly and creatively find ways to surround and bring to their knees those whom they are resisting, sooner or later they will be brought to their own knees. If they do not burn down the edifice that oppresses them, they will self-immolate. An uprising that does not advance when challenged will inevitably have to retreat. If it does not surround, it will be surrounded. If it does not create cracks, it will crack itself. If it does not defeat, it will be defeated.

If mass movements are unable to shrewdly manoeuvre tactically or show flexibility in their methods, then those possessing the instruments of control will overcome them. Only through the engineering of a large network of very small and dedicated centres can the repressive arm of the state be neutralised.

Of course, the definitive end point must come with a qualitative overturn of the balance of power. Such an outcome is only achievable through the mobilisation of all the untapped potentials and channelling all the creative resources: the audacity, the sense of solidarity, the demand for rights, equality and for liberation. Yet, although a continuous struggle along these lines is a necessary condition for success, they are not, however, a sufficient condition. The sources of popular movement are to be found in the various cracks in society, which are full of trade, job, ethnic, sexual, religious, and linguistic divisions. This is the geography that can have a conflicting dual effect on the popular movement.

The necessary condition for success is the ability to move beyond these divisions and cracks. Were this to be achieved, the door would be opened to a resource that is both powerful and invincible. For the same reason, the failure to do so would be very costly and damaging. These potential conflicts and cracks, if not brought onside, will not necessarily become neutralised. Indeed, they can easily be mobilised against the movement and one part of the objective base of that same protest movement can find itself opposing another. This is a something that the machinery of control is well versed in exploiting. We have all witnessed many such reactionary, conservative movements, whether religious, nationalistic, ethnic, sexual, racial or populist.

Those who protest and the powers that confront them are on opposite sides of a social divide. Victory for one camp demands that these fissures are crossed, and rifts overcome, and for the other camp survival depends on deepening and activating such fissures. In short, this geography is a land where there are no bystanders.

To integrate the diversities within society is only possible once you recognise the problems. Reliance on and employing all your resources and potential is only possible when the solidarity and bond between existing diversities are overcome by objective reality. In practice this means overlapping and integrating general and specific demands. It depends on solidarity being made conditional on recognising the diversity of the numerous identities existing within society.

First published as a supplement in the Weekly Worker: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1333/supplement-three-waves-of-protest/

Yassamine Mather

As Binyamin Netanyahu’s government tacitly admits its role, so why the Iranian regime is in denial

There are strong indications that Israel was responsible for a number of incidents in Iran’s military and nuclear sites. On June 20 Tehran’s inhabitants reported a major explosion that lit up the skies east of the capital and the government tried to play down the incident, blaming a gas explosion in Parchin military base.

However, satellite photos showed the incident had occurred slightly further away at Khojir – a missile production plant with underground tunnels that conceal Iran’s arsenal. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida claimed the day after that the explosion was caused by missiles dropped by a number of Israeli F-35 stealth fighter jets, although both Israel and the United States have denied any involvement.

This was followed by major power cuts in the southern city of Shiraz. On July 2 there were reports of a fire and an explosion at one of the buildings in the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility, which is rumoured to be a production plant for centrifuges. While most of the plant is underground, the explosion occurred in one of its few above-ground buildings.

According to Simon Henderson, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “It looks as though a ‘nuclear war’ of sorts has started in the Middle East.”1 Henderson further claims that as a result of the blast Iran’s nuclear programme has been set back for months, if not years. I should warn readers that this ‘Institute’, far from being an independent academic institution, is “an American pro-Israel think tank based in Washington”, as Wikipedia puts it – “part of the core” of the Israel lobby in the United States (a charge that WINEP denies).2

Then on July 10 The New York Times claimed it had first-hand information that “a joint American-Israeli strategy is evolving – some might argue regressing – to a series of short-of-war clandestine strikes”.3 The Iranian press was also quick to blame Israel. According to Nournews, which is often associated with the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council, Israel could not have been responsible for the Natanz explosion operation without getting a green light from Washington: “If we accept that the Zionist regime’s role [in the incident] is true, then we have to accept that they had received US approval to directly engage with Iran.”4

Javad Karimi Ghodousi of Iran’s national security committee blamed International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, accusing them of acting as spies for the Israeli government. He added that the explosion at the nuclear site took place in the building that IAEA inspectors had examined six times: “The incident is a result of the infiltration and information-gathering in favour of the Zionist regime conducted by the inspectors.”5

In fact Israeli officials just stopped short of claiming responsibly for the Natanz incident. According to foreign minister Gabi Ashkenazi, “We have a long-term policy over the course of many administrations not to allow Iran to have nuclear abilities … We take actions that are better left unsaid.”6

There are obvious reasons why Binyamin Netanyahu and his government might have been behind it. After all, the much heralded annexation of parts of the occupied Palestinian territories planned for July 1 did not happen after widespread opposition from European states. The opponents of the annexation included the pro-Israeli UK premier, Boris Johnson, who, writing in Israel’s high-circulation daily, Yedioth Ahronoth, stated:

I am a passionate defender of Israel. So it is with sadness that I have followed the proposals to annex Palestinian territory … I am fearful that these proposals will fail in their objective of securing Israel’s borders and will be contrary to Israel’s own long-term interests.7

All this coincided with low poll ratings for Donald Trump, who, of course, is Israel’s most important ally. However, whatever the reasons, the delay did not go down well with pro-settler Israeli politicians, who accused Netanyahu of “giving up” on plans to annex the Jordan valley in favour of more-limited moves. Former justice minister Ayelet Shaked accused Netanyahu of preparing to abandon the plan.

Under such circumstances, the Israeli government needed something to divert attention and the Natanz incident could have been part of such plans. Perhaps both Washington and Tel Aviv hoped Iran’s Islamic Republic would retaliate, paving the way for an all-out regional war. If that happened, no doubt every western institution from the European Union to the United Nations would express sympathy with Israel and perhaps see good reasons to go along with the annexation of Palestinian territory. If that was the plan, Iran’s current policy of downplaying these incidents must be infuriating for both the Trump and Netanyahu administrations.

Hypocrisy

Once more these events have showed the complete collapse of sections of the Iranian left. Some claimed they were concerned about the negative effects of Iran’s nuclear industry on the climate, while others berated “out-of-date anti-imperialists”, who keep going on about Israel!

Whenever we in Hands Off the People of Iran (Hopi) have addressed the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, we have pointed out that it is the safety of Iran’s nuclear industry itself that poses a threat, not the alleged development of nuclear weapons. It is clear that the regime does not value the life of its civilians or even its own supporters. In 2020 both the Islamic Republic’s cavalier attitude towards Covid-19 and hostility towards demonstrators at the funeral of assassinated general Qasem Soleimani and against the downing of a civilian plane have proved this basic fact.

However, let us be very clear that another Middle Eastern state – namely, Israel – most certainly possesses nuclear weapons. Decades after the abduction and imprisonment of Mordechai Vanunu, the nuclear technician who exposed the extent of Israel’s nuclear programme, the country still denies having nuclear bombs. It is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and it is estimated that Israel has a stockpile of between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads.

Its Dimona plant has been at the centre of court battles between its former employees and pensioners, seeking compensation for nuclear leaks. In April 2016 the Israeli daily Ha’aretz reported that the plant has more than 1,500 defects – some detected as early as 1963.8 In September 2017, Dimona pensioners and surviving members of their families finally received a total of $22 million compensation from the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, which is part of the prime minister’s office.9

All this shows that Israel’s ‘secret’ nuclear programme is as dangerous to its own citizens and its neighbours as Iran’s nuclear industry. It poses a major threat not only to the peace and security of the Middle East, as well as Europe and North Africa, but also to the region’s environment.

Hopi has always maintained a very clear position – we want a nuclear-free region, which means, of course, the destruction of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. If Iran had nuclear weapons (and there is no evidence at all that it does) we would be demanding their destruction too. But to single out the nuclear programme of Iran’s Islamic Republic while ignoring another religious state’s actual nuclear weapons is totally hypocritical.

Anyone with an iota of intelligence knows that meddling with the control systems of a nuclear plant by hacking its computing system, or carrying out air raids against such plants, could cause an unprecedented ecological catastrophe.

Closer to home, the events of the last few weeks in the Middle East should act as a wake-up call for those who are still under the impression that false accusations of anti-Semitism directed against the left inside and outside the Labour Party are all down to a desire to undermine Jeremy Corbyn. The current witch-hunt has far more ambitious aims: it is about securing European support for the USA’s pro-Israel geopolitical agenda, and silencing the anti-war movement in this country and beyond.

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1. thehill.com/opinion/international/505975-will-iran-go-nuclear-over-its-latest-nuke-site-setback.↩︎
2. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Washington_Institute_for_Near_East_Policy.↩︎
3. nytimes.com/2020/07/10/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-trump.html.↩︎
4. middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-press-review-iran-warns-israel-over-direct-confrontation-following-natanz-explosion.↩︎
5. Ibid.↩︎
6. rferl.org/a/israel-launches-new-spy-satellite-to-monitor-iran-/30709355.html.↩︎
7. timesofisrael.com/in-hebrew-op-ed-uks-johnson-implores-israel-to-drop-annexation-bid.↩︎
8. haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-dimona-reactor-plagued-by-1-537-defects-scientists-say-1.5440719.↩︎
9. . haaretz.com/israel-news/cancer-stricken-israeli-nuclear-reactor-workers-awarded-22-million-1.5451774.↩︎

Yassamine Mather

Why attempts to ‘root out corruption’ are not taken seriously

This week, as the world awaited Israel’s possible annexation of Palestinian territories, Iran’s Islamic Republic remained relatively quiet about the subject. In fact in recent weeks even ‘moderate’ Arab states, such as Kuwait and Jordan, have been vocal in expressing strong opposition to this dangerous possible move.

But there are good reasons for Iran’s reticence. The country is in the midst of yet another major crisis: an ailing dictator trying to ensure his successor; an economic situation bordering on total collapse, thanks to sanctions, as well as corruption and economic mismanagement; the second wave of a pandemic is taking a terrible toll; not to forget the damaging consequences of a number of high-profile trials involving senior members of the clergy or their immediate relatives, who held or currently hold top positions in the government or the judiciary. They face accusations of multi-billion dollar corruption.

In addition, news has recently been dominated by the suicide/murder of a former judge and cleric, Gholamreza Mansouri, in Bucharest. Reports about his death appear alongside pictures of the luxury apartments and villas associated with a pending trial, where there were allegations of his involvement with other corrupt senior clerics and non-clerics, all with connections to one or another of the many factions of the Islamic Republic.

Ironically, on many news websites there are also photos of sugar workers and miners complaining of their families’ hunger – a direct result of non-payment of their wages – together with protests against privatisation. The irony lies in the fact that the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, appears to be under the illusion that he presides over a ‘post-revolutionary’ government – one that came to power promising ‘equality’.

In all this mess, the highlight of the week was Khamenei’s defence of the current and former heads of the country’s judiciary: ayatollahs Ebrahim Raisi and Amoli Larijani. For many years Iranians have been aware of allegations of major corruption amongst senior figures in the judiciary. However, the arrest of Larijani’s former deputy, Akbar Tabari, in July 2019, for financial misdeeds, alongside a major financial corruption trial involving a number of senior judges accused of embezzlement and bribery in recent weeks, has led to widespread dissatisfaction amongst ordinary Iranians.

One of the co-defendants in the Tabari case was the now deceased Gholamreza Mansouri, who had been notorious for handing down long jail sentences to labour activists, journalists and political opponents of the regime. In recent years he had been in charge of investigating torture in Iranian prisons – although there were allegations that he himself had been responsible for such torture of the regime’s political opponents. With the trial looming, Mansouri left Iran – the authorities accusing him of absconding with half a million euros. He initially claimed to be in Germany for medical treatment, but just after the start of the Tabari trial last month he appeared in Bucharest.

There are reports that he visited the Iranian embassy – possibly in an attempt to negotiate a deal to allow his return to Iran. If that was the case, there was certainly no deal, as the Iranian authorities asked Interpol to help with his extradition. As a result, Mansouri was arrested. He was due to appear in a court hearing regarding his extradition on July 10, but on June 19 his body was found on the ground outside the Duke Hotel in Bucharest. Apparently he had fallen six storeys. The initial investigation suggested suicide, but since then doubts have arisen. There are reports that there was a packed suitcase in his room, suggesting that he was preparing to flee.

Hadi Shirzad, who heads Iran’s international police department, said last week that according to information supplied by Interpol, Mansouri had jumped out of his hotel window. Opponents of the regime see similarities with the death of Saeed Emami, an intelligence officer of the ministry of information who was accused of masterminding a series of political murders in Iran. He too allegedly committed suicide, in Tehran’s Evin prison, while awaiting trial in 1999. Sections of the Iranian press suggested at the time that Emami had been silenced to prevent him implicating other intelligence officers. The allegation regarding Mansouri is that he was killed to prevent him exposing accomplices in corruption scandals engulfing high-ranking government and judicial officials.

Loyalty test

Irrespective of whether the allegations are true, no-one can doubt the willingness of Khamenei to forgive those accused of major corruption – as long as they remain loyal to him, of course. A very good example is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who with the opening of the new majles (Iran’s Islamic parliament) is the new speaker. Ghalibaf always likes to emphasise his military and political credentials – as a trained pilot, former mayor of Tehran, national police chief and head of the national anti-trafficking headquarters. However, most Iranians remember the various corruption and embezzlement allegations made against him. In 2018 the majles dealt with a motion calling for an investigation of his time as mayor of Tehran, when he allegedly granted close associates more than $500 million worth of real estate in the capital’s affluent suburbs at cut-rate prices. The parliamentary motion was dropped under pressure from conservative MPs.

The US journal Foreign Policy was quick to capitalise on Ghalibaf’s appointment as speaker of the majles. In an article headed ‘Corruption is a job qualification in today’s Iran’, we find this claim: “Iran’s new speaker of parliament is widely known for being a crook – but a loyal one.”1

However, Khamenei’s support for well known corrupt officials follows its own logic. The collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the imposition of harsh new sanctions by the United States coincide with a time when Iran is facing military setbacks in Syria and losing political allies in Iraq. The new situation has paved the way for the ascendancy of a new hard-line rightwing leadership within the regime. The era of ‘Islamic reformism’ is coming to an end.

Ebrahim Raisi – a cleric and judge notorious for his involvement in the mass murder of political prisoners in the late 1980s – is the new head of the judiciary. Raisi, who fought and lost the presidential elections of 2017, is said to be Khamenei’s favourite to become the next vali faghih (supreme leader). Raisi’s anti-corruption drive – a process that started with the sacking and then arrest of Akbar Tabari, former deputy head of the judiciary – is linked to his attempts at eliminating rivals to succeed Khamenei.

No wonder this latest attempt to ‘root out corruption’ is not taken seriously by most Iranians.

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1. foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/26/corruption-is-a-job-qualification-in-todays-iran.↩︎

Вы давно играете в казино игры и настроены попробовать что-то новое? Стоит попробовать вавада зеркало и вам предоставится большое количество новых возможностей. В этом году Vavada рабочее зеркало предоставляет доступ к большому количеству новых игр.

Вы попробовали свои силы в игровых аппаратах или рулетке и теперь увлечены этим «игровым миром». Но в вашем городе нет азартного учреждения, но вам хочется полагаться на технологии. Не беда – вы пришли в правильное место, и в отличное время! В азартном сервисе произошли определённые перемены и мужчины и женщины охотно играют в азартные игры удалённо. У вас не загружается ресурс? Нет доступа к игровому сервису?

В случае с игровым клубом Вавада, многие переходят на платформу через Vavada казино зеркало. Вы можете Вавада казино зеркало на сегодня открыть и запустить через планшет. Многие из игроков также пользуются азартными играми через мобильные устройства.

Азартное заведение Вавада предоставит возможность играть через браузер, предлагает шанс создания тестовых развлечений на игровые деньги, а также разнообразные бонусы демо-игры. Если вам уже исполнилось 18 лет, вы без проблем сможете открыть игровой баланс в игровом ресурсе Vavada и получить классные и выгодные награды, которые были созданы специально для всех новичков. Потратьте пять минут свободного времени, для получения необходимой информации касательно игр. Vavada рабочее зеркало на сегодня – это первоклассная опция интересно провести время в сотнях разных казино игр.

Многие знают о казино Vavada. Одной из отличившихся особенностей клуба есть наличие у портала зеркала казино. Эта современная опция значительно упрощает любые сложности с доступом, позволяя всем любителям азартных развлечений смело получать доступ к ресурсу в любых обстоятельствах. Вавада зеркало на 100% защищенно от мошеннических действий. Человек может запустить вавада зеркало рабочее и наслаждаться игрой сразу же.

Vavada зеркало на сегодня предлагает разные варианты игры. Если РКН запрещает сайт, использование зеркала – уникальная возможность. Вы имеете возможность играть в игровом сервисе игры. Большое количество людей предпочитает запустить зеркало вавада с целью, чтобы интересно провести время в азартных соревнованиях. Есть также часть ребят, которые Вавада зеркало в настоящий момент используют с той целью, чтобы научиться играть. Это соответственно пользователи – новички.

Vavada официальный сайт – вход на сайт дарит большие возможности

Как ТОП азартные клубы в Европе, можно смело выбрать сайт Vavada, где есть известные игры от Novomatic, среди которых Book of Ra, Dolphin’s Pearl и Lucky Lady’s Charm.

В России вавада казино официальный портал достаточно известен! Стоит сказать, что в этом году вавада официальный ресурс входит в рейтинг 5 лучших игровых клубов. Популярность онлайн казино Vavada также известна за счёт турниров, которые проходят в игровом заведении.

Официальный сайт Вавада предлагает игры на русском языке. Сайт в целом очень проверенный. На веб-странице азартного клуба Вавада не бывает проблем с задержкой, а также каких-либо багов с выводом валюты.

Известность в РФ игрового клуба Vavada очень высокая. Как правило это из-за интерфейса, а также совместимости азартного портала с мобильными ОС.

Главные плюсы игровой платформы:

• Усовершенствованный интерфейс;

Большое количество разных игр;
Большое количество турниров;

Работа support в игровом сервисе Vavada оценивается хорошо. Настоящая версия платформы Vavada предлагает качественное обслуживание пользователей. В 2024 году казино ресурс обладает всеми параметрами защиты. Настоящая версия казино клуба Вавада казино пользуется большим спросом!

Как создать игровой аккаунт в казино Vavada? Регистрация в клубе занимает 1 минуту

Интерес к азартному клубу проявляется у всех без исключения игроков, которые играют в азартные игры удалённо. Учитывая степень развития азартных клубов, игровой клуб интегрирован в разные социальные сети.

Для комфортной игры в азартном сервисе Вавада, вам понадобится Vavada регистрация. Этот процесс прост и не требует финансовых вложений. Изначально посетите официальный сайт, нажмите клавишу «Регистрация».

Создание игрового профиля в Vavada казино — это первое, что надо сделать. На домашней странице Vavada нажимаем кнопку «Регистрация» в правом верхнем углу. После этого перейдите к заполнению формы по личной информации, указав данные: login, e-mail, пароль.

Поставьте галочки рядом с пунктом «Я принимаю положения о конфиденциальности» и нажмите кнопку «Зарегистрироваться». В качестве последнего шага кликаем на иконку «Подтвердить адрес электронной почты», содержащийся в полученном сообщении e-mail, и ваш профиль будет активирован.

Наконец, на последнем, заключительном этапе азартному клиенту надо принять правила и условия казино, а также политику конфиденциальности и внести информацию, желаете ли вы получать информационный бюллетень от азартного ресурса Вавада (это нужно для получения эксклюзивных рекламных акций).

После всех этих действий Вам будет предоставлен вавада вход. В текущее время вавада казино вход предлагается очень быстро и через планшеты. Дополнительно надо выделить информацию, что vavada вход в игровой портал бесплатный, из-за этого будьте внимательны, чтобы не попасть на мошенников. Игра доступна на EUR, PLN, RUB, а также USD.

Вавада зеркало загрузить

Программа Вавада — это мобильная адаптивная версия, которая предусматривает возможность заманчиво и интересно проводить время в игровых автоматах. Эта адаптивная версия Вавада предназначена для обеспечения стандартного и немедленного доступа к большому спектру игр.

Загрузка и начало игры на телефоне — стандартный и понятный процесс. Вот как это организовать для Android и iOS: зайдите на официальный портал, прокрутите вниз, пока не увидите раздел, посвященный адаптивной версии.

Пользователи высоко оценили комфортный интерфейс и простоту навигации. Помимо этого, адаптивная версия получила максимально объективную оценку за конкурентные коэффициенты ставок на спорт и разнообразие разных вариантов депозитов.

Стоит знать о том, что вавада казино скачать нельзя. Приложения не существует, в этой связи Вавада скачать не получится! Если вы настроены казино Vavada загрузить, лучше перейти в адаптивную версию. Она не отличается от программы для игры в веб-казино, а в кое-каких вариантах и лучше.

Также не рекомендуется загружать вавада приложение, так как вы можете попасть на трояны. Так как вавада загрузить не предоставляется опции, азартные участники могут играть в азартные игры с мобильного устройства, планшета и даже ПК через классический стандартный браузер. Прямая ссылка на казино сервис тут.

Демонстрационные игры в азартном клубе Vavada

Вы новый азартный участник и стремитесь попробовать свои силы в каком-то популярном игровом учреждении? Вавада играть виртуально бесплатно предоставляет такую возможность. Многие из ребят имеют шанс протестировать Вавада казино.

Существенно важным критерием для проверки стабильности оператора есть опция опробовать игровые аппараты бесплатно, опция, которую интернет-казино Вавада предлагает в целом для всех азартных развлечений с генератором случайных чисел (для live игр эта опция исключена по техническим причинам).

Чтобы опробовать забавы из ассортимента Vavada, вам не нужно создавать аккаунт на сайте, есть опция легко потренироваться в игральном процессе, перейдя на сайт клуба, чтобы развлечься в целом бесплатно. Бура, крэпс, игры в кости, рулетка, вендеры – это все можно опробовать в демонстрационной версии. Вавада игровое учреждение имеет ряд скрытых плюсов, которые также относятся к бесплатной игре.

Если вас заинтересовала бесплатная игра Vavada, вам не нужно моментально создавать аккаунт. Азартным участникам предоставляются специальные профили, где они имеют возможность собирать опыт. И да, представьте себе, что игра без вложений уже доступна! Однако, в Vavada игровом сервисе играть бесплатно можно только после того, как мужчине или женщине исполнится 18+.

A week before Donald Trump made his infamous comments about drinking disinfectant as a cure for coronavirus, a self-appointed ‘Islamic medical expert’ in Iran had filmed himself on Instagram drinking camel urine. He claims it should be used to treat anyone suffering from the current pandemic. Exiled Iranian broadcasters – especially Saudi- and US-financed TV stations – were covering the story for a few days, as if this was the most important item of global news.

It should be stressed that Mehdi Sabili, the man featured in the video, has no official position in Iran and the Arab News claim that his Instagram account is “popular among some of the regime’s loyalists”¹ is meaningless. There are thousands of such social media cranks in Iran and elsewhere. Yet a week later, when the US president made a far more dangerous and stupid claim about curing coronavirus by drinking disinfectant and injecting bleach, the same Persian-speaking media outlets (with the exception of BBC Persian) were extremely quiet about this suggestion or the worldwide condemnation that followed. The exception was a tweet by a producer/presenter on ‘Saudi International’ TV (the name given by Iranians to a Persian TV station broadcasting from London), who compared the two.

This was a bizarre comparison. Mehdi Sabili is a silly individual, whose claims were immediately rebuked by the Iranian government. Trump is the president of the world hegemon power – the man who under normal circumstances many would have expected to be leading global efforts to deal with the pandemic. The incident and the disparity in reporting reflects in some ways the fact that the ‘cold war’ (or media war) against Iran started a long time ago and, as in any other war, truth is the first victim.

Clearly, for all these pro-regime-change media outlets, which promise the dawn of democracy following a US-led military intervention, criticising Trump is not on the agenda. Such criticism might be interpreted as going soft on the main enemy: Iran’s Islamic Republic.

In the midst of all this misinformation, when it comes to the number of victims of coronavirus or Iran’s response to the pandemic, it is impossible to believe either the Islamic Republic or its pro-regime-change opponents. According to the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, the country will now be divided up into white, yellow and red regions based, on the number of infections and deaths. The categorisation will determine the level of activity permitted in each region: an area that has been consistently free of infections will be labelled ‘white’, and there mosques will be able to reopen for Friday prayers. According to the deputy health minster, Iraj Harirchi, this means 116 areas will be in the white sector.

Last week Rouhani claimed Iran was doing better fighting the various pandemics than a number of advanced industrial countries – a view echoed by none other than London’s Blairite mayor, Sadiq Khan. Speaking in an interview on Press TV, Iran’s English-language station, Khan claimed that Iran had been more successful in combating Covid-19 than the UK. (Speaking earlier in a video conversation with Tehran’s mayor, Pirouz Hanachi, Khan had said most of the required measures taken in London are similar to those employed in Iran.)

It is interesting to note that there has been no major outcry about this interview – by all accounts a propaganda coup for the Islamic Republic – as opposed to the treatment Jeremy Corbyn received for an interview with the same station a few years ago.

However, there is some doubt about the accuracy of Iran’s coronavirus statistics. For example, on April 28 it was claimed there had been 92,584 confirmed cases, of whom 72,439 patients had recovered and 5,877 had died. According to official figures, there have been 100 deaths amongst doctors and nurses, but many Iranians believe the real figure is much higher. Having said that, Iran’s enemies have made so many exaggerated claims about the number of patients dying from the disease that no-one believes a word they are saying. In early April Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu shared a fake video from the 2007 mini-series made by Hallmark, called Pandemic and claimed it was evidence that Iran was covering up its coronavirus deaths. According to news agency reports, Netanyahu discussed the clip during an online cabinet meeting, saying he had seen a film of Iranian soldiers dumping dead coronavirus patients into trash piles to conceal the country’s actual death toll.

Nuclear deal

In the midst of all this Iran has asked for a $5 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund and a lifting of US sanctions, at least for the duration of the pandemic. But Trump and his secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, have not only ignored calls by US Democrats and European countries for a temporary lifting of sanctions: they actually plan to increase them and over the last few weeks we have witnessed a ratcheting up of threats.

On April 27, The New York Times reported on Pompeo’s plans to argue that the US remains a participant in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the 2015 nuclear deal struck between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany – and wanted to trigger what is called a ‘snapback provision’ that would bring back all the pre-2015 UN-related sanctions. Using this mechanism, a country can complain about Iranian non-compliance and demand that Tehran resolves the issue within 30 days; otherwise UN sanctions would be reapplied. Of course, there is a slight problem here, in that two years ago the United States unilaterally left the JCPOA.

Since then the threat of secondary sanctions, plus heavy fines imposed by the US treasury on banks and institutions which continue dealing with Iran, has stopped most European countries and investors doing business there. On April 27, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tweeted:

Two years ago, Pompeo and his boss declared ‘ceasing US participation’ in JCPOA, dreaming that their ‘max pressure’ would bring Iran to its knees. Given that policy’s abject failure, he now wants to be JCPOA participant. Stop dreaming: Iranian nation always decides its destiny.²

But last week, as tension between the two countries escalated, Trump tweeted: “I have instructed the United States navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”

So in the middle of a pandemic not only are we unlikely to get ceasefires, peace deals and the lifting of sanctions: the world hegemon power is determined to increase tension, and add to existing sanctions. Such threats go down well with Trump’s support base at a time when the pandemic is supposed to have affected his presidential re-election prospects.

As we contemplate that possibility of additional sanctions, it is worth reminding everyone how, contrary to Trump’s claims, sanctions affect ordinary people, while those in power are largely unaffected – in fact they may become richer and more powerful by taking advantage of their status. This has definitely been the case in Iran, where those close to circles of power, both within the government and amongst the Revolutionary Guards, have accumulated huge fortunes, benefiting from the black market and access to favourable rates of exchange. Sanctions have given them a unique opportunity to take advantage of the hoarding of goods, price rises and a monopoly over distribution.

However, as a direct consequence of sanctions, millions of workers have been made redundant and often they now have to rely on casual, low-paid jobs to make ends meet. But, as a direct result of the pandemic, even these casual jobs are disappearing., It is estimated that three to six million Iranians will be without work as a result of Covid-19.

And, in this situation, sanctions are increasing the death toll: as elsewhere, there is a shortage of ventilators, medications, surgical equipment, protective clothing and masks – something that is impossible to resolve precisely because of sanctions. Yet there is a relatively strong lobby of Iranian exiles and Iranian-American supporters of Donald Trump who are working day and night with the US state department to make sure current sanctions stay and more people suffer: this would supposedly bring down the Islamic Republic and perhaps even bring the idiot son of the ex-shah, Reza Pahlavi, to power. This scenario is truly bizarre, because so far it has had the opposite effect to what these royalists have wanted: increased pressure from the US has made the government more popular and united the various factions of the regime.

Propaganda

These royalists and the US state department have also started a concerted campaign calling on supreme leader Ali Khamenei to use his foundation’s external funds to pay for the country’s response to the pandemic instead of asking for sanctions relief. As a general rule, of course, it is not a bad idea that the rich should pay to alleviate hardship, but the problem is, why limit such a call to Khamenei and his foundation (worth an estimated $95 billion)? This is not his personal wealth – he uses it to finance various international ideological campaigns, but, if it was a personal fortune, why should we single out Iranian leaders when making such a call? Why not make the same demand on others? How about Trump himself financing the necessary anti-Covid-19 measures in the US? Or Elizabeth Windsor donating her fortune to the national health service, instead of just praising the efforts of a 99-year-old to raise funds?

The way Iranian pro-Trump, rightwing pressure groups operate is also interesting. Both in Canada and the United States, organisations such as the Project for the New American Century – made up of neoconservative Republicans and Democrats, as well as Zionists – have created and funded a plethora of anti-Islamic Republic ‘foundations’, ‘institutions’ and ‘research centres’. A quick web search allows you to see who is funding them. They all employ exiled Iranians (often with very limited intellectual capabilities), some ex-supporters of the Islamic Republic, including former supporters of the ‘reformist’ faction of the regime who have moved steadily to the right, and others who have always been supporters of royalist or other rightwing groups. These people are given exaggerated academic titles in what are clearly non-academic institutions. They are called ‘expert’, ‘senior researcher’, ‘principal investigator’, etc, and given a platform to express their pro-Trump, pro-royalist opinions on the Persian-speaking media.

They are regularly interviewed – at times because of ‘the need to give a balanced view’ – even though you might think from some of the ill-informed comments they make they have never read a book in their life. They repeat ad infinitum exactly the same thing (I would not be surprised if some uneducated, low-ranking state department official had sent an identical memo to all of them). They speak out for sanctions, for Reza Pahlavi, and tell us how people inside Iran really love Trump for imposing those sanctions. No-one seems to ask why we have to listen to these fools.

No wonder the vast majority of Iranians have no confidence in either the current regime or these pathetic opponents.

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1. . arabnews.com/node/1662831/offbeat. ↩︎
2. . al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/iran-zarif-us-sanctions-nuclear-deal-coronavirus.html.↩︎