Rahe Kargar, or ‘Left Unity’ in Farsi, have published a list of those who have added their signatures to the latest statement by striking oil workers. View the PDF below (mostly in Farsi).
Webinar on the oil workers’ strike (in Farsi)
وبینار نشریهی کریتیک با محمد مالجو و پرویز صداقت با موضوع واکاوی اعتصاب کارگران نفت و گاز
Statement No. 6 of the Council of Organizing the Protests of Oil Pact Workers
A few important points
– Given the fact that our strike is spreading fast and workers from other sections are joining this strike, and the support and solidarity we have received, we are in a good position to win important parts of our demands. With our widespread strikes so far, there is heavy pressure on the plundering contractors, and we have reached a situation where it is in their interests to end the strike soon.
– It is clear that we need to make some decisions about the results of the strike, how to achieve our demands and under what conditions we are going to negotiate. However we must avoid any hasty decisions and avoid early negotiations.
– The main dangers threatening our nationwide strike are the possibility that the enemy will create divisions amongst the workers and lack of clarity regarding our plan of action. Employers and officials will try their best to create divisions amongst the workers, accepting the minimum demands from some workers and urging them to return to work, then forcing the rest of us to go back to work. We need to be vigilant against such plots.
– The way the administrators of the Telegram Groups ‘Kariabi Piping’ and ‘Arkan seh’ channels address the workers is like the way a commander would address soldiers, they give orders and forbid us to take this or other action, and clearly they are happy to accept minimum concessions and the end of the strike. That is why their campaign was a campaign to evacuate work places. They say have fun with your family and we are here and trust in us. Wherever there is a protest or a rally, they stand against it and create a security ‘incident’. Workers need to know that the time for trusting others is over. We have to decide for ourselves. Such groups want to control everything and label anyone who says something different as divisive or worse. We have to say clearly: we don’t need self-appointed representatives. Representatives of each section should be our elected representatives and we must be involved in every level of decision making.
– Considering the fact that workers on strike in Asaluyeh and Kangan have left their camps, it is impossible to elect a representative or group of representatives tasked to negotiate with employers in those locations. In these areas, we should establish our telegram groups as soon as possible and elect our representatives. This is our right. Gathering in a group and talking about our demands and choosing our genuine representatives is not controversial.
– One solution to maintain unity is to determine a single set of national demands so that once there are negotiations we don’t consent to less than those demands and be a role model for other sections. Meanwhile, right now as a first step, we must put pressure on the employers to state their stance regarding workers’ demands with complete transparency and in a written public format (as stated in the 5th statement of our Organisational Council). On that basis, we too will announce our collective decision.
– We don’t accept secret negotiations held behind closed doors, such negotiations ignore workers. Decisions made between negotiators, employers and contractors will only be recognised if the workforce are notified and approve them.
– The first negotiations or agreements that will probably take place between workers and employers in several contracting companies are important and can be the basis for negotiations with other companies. So we have to be careful about this, because once these first agreements are signed and workers in these companies return to work the goals of the strike will be determined for the rest of the workforce. It is very important that we take the initiative in these cases and try to make sure our initial and immediate demands are clear and form the basis of negotiations with contractors.
– Our demands are:
- wage increases based on our suggested figures for different levels of skilled workers: no worker should be paid less than 12 million tomans (2000 pounds), workers should have permanent work contracts and job security, and wages should be paid on-time each month
- the work environment should be safe and workplaces as well as workers’ dormitories should be air conditioned, we call for substantial improvement of the conditions of workers dormitories, restrooms and bathrooms, and allocation of suitable food
- creation of medical facilities in workplaces as well as free health insurance for workers
- our main demand is an end to contract employment and the abolition of special economic zones where employers can impose their own rules. By fighting for our demands we can reduce the power of contractors and declare that from today the government must oversee the implementation of all agreements that are decided in negotiations with employers.
– The local protest organising council must channel the discussions regarding negotiations with the employers. Send your demands and ideas to the local organising councils, introduce them to your friends and become a member. At the same time, create your networks wherever you can so that we can regularly think about how to progress our protests.
We would like to thank all the workers, organisations and people who have supported our protests and demands. Our urgent duty is to cooperate with any group and institution that backs the interests of the striking workers. Our emphasis is on unity and solidarity of labour. Hoping for victory,
The Council of Organising the Protests of Oil Workers
Tir 17, 1400 (July 8th, 2021)
Solidarity messages to Iranian oil workers
Oil and gas workers in Iran on one-day and other short-term contracts have gone on strike. They are demanding the reinstatement of sacked colleagues, full-time employment, better pay, more time off to see their families, improved living conditions and an end to the special economic zones and the system of subcontracting.
The strike was initiated by workers who are employed by subcontracting companies operating as intermediaries between privatised or state-owned oil and gas companies, on the one hand, and the workforce, on the other. Currently tens of thousands of workers at 22 refineries – including Jahan Pars, Gachsaran Petrochemicals, Tehran Refinery and Abadan Refinery – are on strike. A number of companies have been forced to stop operations.
As the workers point out, faced with the spiralling cost of living, they cannot support their families with their meagre earnings. The work is hazardous. The living conditions are appalling. Many of them work in southern Iran, where the summer temperature reaches almost 50 degrees centigrade. Workers are accommodated in dormitories.
There is widespread support from other workers in Iran. The full-time employees of the National Iranian Oil Company are threatening to join the strike if the demands of the short-term contract workers are not met.
Send solidarity messages via Hopi to the Council for Organising Protests by Oil Contract Workers and they will be added here.
1. To the Council for Organising Protests by Oil Contract Workers
Greetings of Solidarity to the oil workers, sugar cane workers and teachers of Iran who are taking strike action for better pay and conditions. I wish you every success in your battle for economic and political justice. The workers of Iran have a proud history of challenging the capitalist economic system and opposing tyranny, imperialism and war. If we stand shoulder to shoulder in solidarity, the workers of the world can complete our historical task of overthrowing capitalism and building a socialist society free of classes, exploitation, poverty and war.
In Solidarity
James Loftus
Wales, UK
Mass strikes by oil workers in Iran
Contract workers in Iranian oil and gas projects and petrochemical plants have gone on strike in Iran demanding better wages, an end to systematic non-payment of wages, better living conditions and an end to the dominance of unscrupulous contractors.
The strike was initiated by workers employed by subcontracting companies, who impose short-term contracts on workers and operate as a buffer between privatised or state-owned oil and gas companies and the work force. Currently thousands of workers at 22 refineries and projects in the major oil and gas centres, including Jahan Pars, Gachsaran Petrochemicals, Tehran Refinery and
Abadan Refinery are on strike, forcing a number of projects to suspend operations.
As the workers point out, faced with the spiralling cost of living they cannot feed their families with the meagre wages they earn. In addition their living conditions are horrific. Many of them work in south Iran where in the summer temperature is near 50 degrees centigrade, and living conditions in workers’ dormitories are unbearable.
Employees of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) have declared their support and will join the strike on 30 June.
The strike continues until our demands are met
Second statement of the Council for Organising Protests by Oil Contract Workers – Iran
We, the contract oil workers in refineries, petrochemical and power plants, went on strike on June 20, as we had announced. Tens of thousands of our colleagues are currently on strike, and our colleagues who are permanent employees in the oil industry will gather in July.
Meanwhile, during the same period, we have gained support from workers in phases (districts?)10 to 14 of Assaluyeh. So far, we are doing well and we welcome all our colleagues.
Friends, the oil workers’ central demand, both in the formal sector and the contract sector, is wage increases. We workers no longer tolerate poverty, insecurity, discrimination and inequality and deprivation of basic human rights. As we have stated, as a result of staggering price rises, no workers’ wages should be less than twelve million tomans. At the same time, our colleagues have the right to demand salary increases in accordance with their levels of work expertise. Our colleagues who are permanent employees of the oil industry are also protesting against the daily decrease in their purchasing power and the state of their wages in 1400 (2021-2022), which is in fact an attack on their lives and livelihood.
Dear colleagues! Our unity in struggle and the fact that so many have joined the strike makes us very proud and we express our thanks to everyone. However we must try to consolidate this alliance in advancing our protests.
We must prevent any kind of division and intrigue by doing our utmost to advance the struggle. We should continue making collective decisions; we can’t leave the struggle to a few individuals who are announcing campaigns in our defence here and there, and allow them to make all the decisions. Rather, by being present and staying in workers’ dormitories and planning protest rallies in front of refineries and oil centres, or by actively participating in the groups we have on social media, we should be actively involved every day in deciding how to advance our struggle.
This is an important lesson that we have learned from the Haft Tappeh sugarcane workers, and we must know that only in this way, and through council and collective decision-making, can we prevent possible divisions and clashes imposed from above. Do not let them lead us with promises, and as we have warned, if our demands are not answered by the end of next month, we must prepare to continue wider protests.
Dear colleagues! During the last few days of strike, some of our colleagues left their workplace and returned home, but some of us have remained in workers’ dormitories. The reason is that we want to pursue our demands with maximum presence. Ruthless employers are firing day labourers and preparing to hire new workers. Therefore, if we stay in the dormitories, the employer will not have a place to house the new workforce. At the same time, with our presence, he will not dare to fire us and carry out such conspiracies. From this day on, our recommendation is to return to work after a week of visiting the family and to be present at the work place and continue our strike. Our daily presence in front of petrochemical plants, refineries and power plants is putting more pressure on the employer and helping us pursue our demands.
A number of colleagues, day contract workers in the Tehran refinery have been arrested. We must call for their release and the right of 700 workers, sacked because of the strike, to return to work.
Our strike is nationwide and we must respond to any attacks with a united front.
In addition to the increase in wages, we are asking for ten days of leave for twenty days of work, so that we can visit our families and get away from these deplorable conditions.
In addition, we contract workers need job security. Currently we have no security, despite our health and lives being in constant danger through working in hazardous environments.
The living conditions in the workers’ dormitories are terrible and there is no adherence to basic health and safety rules in the workplace. The laws governing special economic zones (where some oil refineries and exploration fields are) only serve the interests of the worst kind of capitalist bullies, to ensure their total dominance over workers. We demand a curtailing of the contractors’ unlimited power and permanent contracts for all workers: we are calling for the abolition of special economic laws governing these zones, which pave the way for imposition of severe military-style security measures in the oil fields.
Finally we want to address the Iranian people. Our thanks to fellow workers, our comrades at Haft Tappeh Sugarcane plant as well as teachers’ unions, associations of retired employees and student organisations, who have so far supported us with their statements. Have no doubt that this solidarity gives strength to us oil workers.
The demand for wage increases is not just a demand put forward by oil workers, we know that all workers, teachers, retirees and wage earners have the same demand. Therefore we expect the support and encouragement of fellow workers. Please protest against the dismissal of seven hundred of our fellow workers and demand their return to work.
Council for Organising Protests by Oil Contract Workers
Translated /distributed by HOPI
Same old, same old
The election of Ebrahim Raisi hardly signals a major change, writes Yassamine Mather. Yet, while the left remains confused, opposition to the regime is palpable
The result of Iran’s presidential elections, held on June 18, came as no surprise. In a low turnout of just 48.8%, 62% voted for Ebrahim Raisi, while there were an unprecedented 3.7 million spoiled votes. That was more than the votes for Raisi’s two closest rivals: Mohsen Rezaei, a senior conservative general, picked up 3.4 million – mainly from the countryside and small towns – while the only ‘reformist’ candidate permitted to stand, Abdolnasser Hemmati, received just 2.4 million votes.
There are two main points to draw from the election. First, as far as I can tell, the supreme leader and his allies were not too concerned about the level of participation. Initial estimates of the possible turnout were as low as 42% – and that was before the pro-Trump Iranian royalists and the trashy TV station, Iran International, funded by Saudi Arabia, waged a concerted campaign to encourage a boycott. Their intervention created an inevitable backlash – actually increasing voter participation. Until a couple of weeks ago, when I started to listen to ‘clubhouse’ meetings that debated the forthcoming elections, I had not realised how many people inside Iran hate the royalists and the commentators of Iran International. They call them traitors and mercenaries. In those election meetings speaker after speaker expressed revulsion at those who in 2019-21 were calling for sanctions against Iran to be increased!
The second point is that, even before the intervention of the Council of Guardians, banning various ‘reformist’ candidates, it was clear that this faction of the regime had come to the end of its political life. The online debates in the last few weeks have shown to anyone paying the slightest attention that the difference between the two main factions has diminished: the hard-line Islamist ‘principlists’ are not as conservative as they used to be, while the ‘reformists’, who were never, of course, ‘radical’ in the first place, were trying to reconcile their support for an unelected all-powerful ‘supreme leader’ with ‘electioneering’. They clearly are not even as ‘reformist’ as they were under the first term of Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997-2001).
Of course, outgoing president Hassan Rouhani was a late converter to ‘reformism’, having been very much a conservative in his earlier political life, and it could be argued that his second term, marred by incompetence and corruption paved the way for the death of ‘reformist’ politics in the Islamic Republic.
In fact during the election campaign, the more you listened to supporters of both ‘principlists’ and ‘reformists’, the more you followed their articles, the more you came to the conclusion that there were no major differences between them – the possible exception being their attitude to personal freedom, including ‘un-Islamic behaviour’. In fact Raisi tried to present himself as a ‘unity candidate’, bringing together the two main factions of the regime.
As a result (and given the support he got from the Guardian Council), the result was inevitable.
Economic policies
Historically Raisi has made comments about Iran’s self-sufficiency and the ‘resistance economy’ – an echo of supreme leader Ali Khamenei. In reality the claim that a country in debt to international organisations and requiring World Bank and International Monetary Fund approval for its economic policies (including the sensitive issue of subsidies) could actually pursue such policies is just sloganeering.
However, during the election campaign itself Raisi did not say much about a ‘resistance economy’ – instead, promising to end sanctions by pressing for the Iran nuclear deal to be reinstated (see below) and making sure Iran can join the Financial Action Task Force.
He made it clear that he supports privatisation, echoing Khamenei’s approval of changes to article 44 of the constitution, which approved privatisation in almost every sector of the economy:
The government does not have the right to new economic activity outside [those activities] listed in the beginning of principle 44. It is required to transfer any kind of activity (including the continuation and profiting from pre-existing [business] activities) that is not covered by principle 44 to the cooperative, private or public non-governmental sectors, at the latest by the end of the fourth five-year development plan …1
In other words, like all Shia clerics he is a supporter of capitalism and the market.
Regarding the current situation he has said it is a mistake to blame all of Iran’s economic woes on the sanctions imposed on the country by the US: “Inflation is one of the serious problems people are facing today. The price of basic products has gone up considerably.” In one broadcast he compared government officials blaming all problems on the US to “a goalkeeper who lets in 17 goals … and then says, ‘Without me it would have been 30 goals’!”
Raisi claims that the campaign against corruption he started as head of the judiciary will play a significant role in reviving the economy. The slight problem is that, for all his talk, he did not mention the role of religious foundations or of those close to the supreme leader – where, according to some accounts, corruption is as bad as within the sections of the new bourgeoisie close to the ‘reformist’ faction.
On the nuclear deal, Raisi was previously committed to the 2015 agreement, which specifies that Iran must limit its nuclear programme in order to avoid sanctions. He said: “We will be committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an agreement that was approved by the supreme leader” – a claim repeated in the presidential debate of June 12 2021, when he added: “The nuclear deal should be implemented by a strong government. You cannot execute it” – a reference to the position of Abdolnasser Hemmati.
As I have said before, the US is aware that, irrespective of who is president in Iran, it is the supreme leader who decides what happens on the nuclear question. The Biden administration is no doubt keen to make negotiations with Raisi’s foreign minister as short as possible, having spent the last few weeks finalising details of a possible deal that is currently being scrutinised in various capitals.
Executioner
Most of us remember Raisi for his involvement in the mass execution of Iranian political prisoners in 1988. Thousands, mainly leftwingers, were killed on the orders of then supreme leader Ruhollah Khomeini. The final execution orders were signed by a commission that included Raisi himself, when he was deputy prosecutor general. On Monday June 21, replying to a reporter who asked him about the issue, Raisi said: “It is my honour that I fought against hypocrisy”, adding that executions were based on a “fair decision” and were “necessary save lives”! He went on: “In Tehran, there were 100 to 120 assassinations a day by the revolutionary forces … it’s my honour that I fought against hypocrisy.”
This is a reference to the Mojahedin-e Khalq, a group supported by Donald Trump, and by extension was used by Raisi against the entire (and genuine) left too. However, all those executed were already in prison, serving long sentences, so the claim that the mass murder of prisoners was necessary to save civilian lives is simply absurd.
The slaughter took place after eight years of war, when Iran’s Islamic Republic had been forced to accept a humiliating peace with Saddam Hussein (at the time supported by the west). Khomeini said that signing the peace deal was the equivalent of “drinking poison”. So he took his revenge on political prisoners who had nothing to do with the war.
After Raisi’s comments, the spokesperson for the US state department gave a vague reply about Raisi’s role in political executions – and then passed on quickly to the next question. This surprised some Iranian reporters and commemorators. Clearly these people have serious illusions about western ‘democracy’. The US has put or kept in power some of the most cruel dictators of the last century and its attitude towards Raisi will depend on state interests. If the US administration can get a nuclear deal, it will forget about Raisi’s past. But if it cannot or does not want to strike a deal, it will no doubt go on about his role in the executions.
Unfortunately, illusion about western powers has permeated sections of the left too. When it comes to Iran’s foreign and regional policy, you can often hear ‘left’ activists using exactly the same arguments and the same terminology as are used by imperialism and its many media outlets. Iran’s regional policy is ‘interventionist’, ‘adventurist’, ‘dangerous for world peace’ …
I am hardly a fan of its foreign policy, which is aimed at advancing sectarian Shia politics in, for example, Iraq and Lebanon, or in Syria, where support is given to a dictator. However, we have to express our own opinion about such issues – repeating word for word BBC or CNN propaganda is just as appalling as supporting the Tehran regime.
We need to remind everyone that it was the US/UK-led wars and occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq that played a significant role in making Iran a regional power. It is imperialist aggression that remains the main danger on a global scale. Third-world tin-pot dictatorships, such as Iran’s Islamic Republic, are not in a position to present a serious danger when it comes to regional peace. For instance, Iran has been unable to retaliate after successive Israeli attacks against its military and nuclear plants, Nor could it do much after the assassination of nuclear scientists, military leaders, etc. It was the rise of Islamic State – no friend of the Islamic Republic – that paved the way for chaos, the rise of sectarianism and various Iranian interventions in the region.
First published at: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1353/same-old-same-old/
- irandataportal.syr.edu/the-general-policies-pertaining-to-principle-44-of-the-constitution-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.↩︎
Highlights of ‘democracy’
Not only are the candidates useless: the pundits are worse. Yassamine Mather reports on the presidential election campaign, as it enters its closing straight
The most depressing side of watching the third TV debate between the remaining candidates in Iran’s presidential elections on June 18 and the analyses and comments both inside and outside the country is not the absence of any trace of democracy. It is not the fact that royalists and supporters of Donald Trump are the least qualified to talk about elections anywhere in the world. It is not the fact that those who had previously called for support for ‘reformist’ candidates have suddenly realised that in Iran’s Islamic Republic parliamentary and presidential elections are not democratic at all, even by bourgeois standards – as they are ‘managed’, with candidates vetted by an unelected combination of senior clerics in the Guardian Council and the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
What is depressing are the illusions of not just the contenders, but mainly the pundits. They clearly believe all the propaganda coming from western media outlets and do not read or listen to anything beyond the superficial assertions made by the latter. That is why they think corruption, nepotism and economic incompetence are exclusive to dictatorships in the third world. Even when it comes to the Middle East, they buy wholeheartedly into the propaganda coming from imperialist, Saudi and Zionist sources – probably an inevitable consequence of their distrust of the regime.
Candidates and pundits all blame president Hassan Rouhani and his team for the lack of contingency plans to deal with a possible withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – the ‘Iran nuclear deal’) under Donald Trump and his subsequent efforts to impose new sanctions. Yet they seem to be oblivious to the fact that in the next four years – the duration of the term of the future president of Iran – we will witness far more uncertainty than during Trump’s presidency. We are entering a very dangerous and unpredictable time for the third world and the Middle East.
First and foremost will be the issue of the unjust but predictable distribution of Covid vaccines, as the recent G7 meeting acknowledged. Then we have the drive by western states, led by the Biden administration, to espouse neo-Keynesian economic policies – spending huge sums on post-war like reconstruction inside their own borders, but ignoring global poverty. It goes without saying that no developing country can match such expenditure, thus increasing the already huge gap between advanced industrial countries and the developing world. Given the political and economic uncertainty, exacerbated by Covid, investment in the third world will be the last item on the agenda of global capital, even if a rightwing, pro-west government (led by royalists, pro-Saudis or pro-Israelis) were to come to power in Iran.
The majority of Iranians – young and old, pro-regime and anti-regime, have been indoctrinated by the western propaganda of recent decades: there is no alternative and only one solution: neoliberal capitalism. That seemed to be true until recently, but now it seems that the major western economies have no alternative but to follow Keynesian policies. However, in the third world, major debt, the lack of reserves and in the case of Iran severe sanctions leave very little room for manoeuvre. Yet in the midst of this election/boycott fever that has engulfed the country no-one seems to be paying any attention to the dramatic changes in the current global situation.
Debate
The last TV debate – apparently the most ‘exciting’ of the three that have been held – took place on Saturday June 12 and I managed to watch all of it, as well as noting many of the subsequent comments by pundits from both inside and outside Iran.
First, on a generally agreed position: all the candidates bar one, as well as ‘analysts’ and commentators, agree that Iran’s future relies on the US lifting sanctions and returning to the JCPOA, thus ‘paving the way for better relations with the US and the west’. Ebrahim Raisi, who is said to be the preferred candidate of both the supreme leader and the Guardian Council, reiterated his commitment to ensuring a return to the nuclear deal. I might be wrong, but the current stalling of the talks in Vienna could be due to the belief of the US administration that a more lasting, reliable deal is possible with Raisi (however close to the supreme leader he is) than with current foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and his deputy, Abbas Araghchi, who are currently heading Iran’s negotiations in the nuclear talks in Vienna, but have always had considerable difficulty inside the country convincing conservative factions of the necessary measures. US secretary of state Antony Blinken has made it clear that the ultimate decision about the nuclear deal is down to the supreme leader. He and Biden might prefer talking with someone closer to the organ-grinder – hence the current stalling.
During Saturday’s debate the ‘reformist’, Abdolnaser Hemmati, pointed out that Iran’s trade partners, including China and the Shia state in Iraq, cannot pay Iran what they owe, as they are fearful of US sanctions and the subsequent penalties. Ebrahim Raisi and the other conservative candidates (with the exception of Alireza Zakani (a supporter of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who no-one takes seriously) did not disagree with Hemmati on this issue. Raisi also confirmed he will pursue a policy aimed at rejoining the Financial Action Task Force (on money-laundering). These measures will apparently help fulfil his 50 economic promises, which include creating one million jobs per year and reducing inflation to single figures by 2025.
However, while Raisi claims he will end the corrupt relations deriving from a rentier state structure, his opponents point out that as the current chief justice, who heads the judiciary, he has been in a position to deal with the matter, but has so far failed to do so. Abdolnaser Hemmati’s own programme talks of downsizing the government, the expansion of capital markets and independence for the Central Bank of Iran.
During the third debate all the candidates accused each other of covering up, and therefore being implicated in, massive corruption cases. Hemmati displayed an envelope containing the names of a group of 11 major stakeholders who regularly interfere in the economic decisions of the country to support their own corrupt interests. He challenged Raisi to read out the names, but the latter did not respond.
As of June 16, the official ‘reformist’ camp has not endorsed either of the two candidates associated with their tendency, although senior ‘reformist’ figures have issued statements or tweets on the elections. They fall into two categories: those who say that these are not elections worthy of any participation; and those who have endorsed voting for a particular candidate. Ayatollah Mehdi Karroubi, one of the leaders of the ‘green’ movement, says he will vote for Hemmati, while Gholamhossein Karbaschi – general secretary of the centre-right Executives of Construction, of which Hemmati is a member – has also urged voting for the former central bank governor.
Ayatollah Mohammad Khatami, the first ‘reformist’ president, is urging Iranians to vote to defend the ‘republic’ element of the Islamic regime. While Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was prime minister for most of the 80s, has contented himself with issuing a very unclear general statement, his comments have been interpreted as a call both to vote and to boycott the election. As in 2009 – when he failed to give any clear leadership to the tens of thousands who were on the streets of major Iranian cities, protesting against the results of a presidential election they believed he had won – he is incapable of giving a straight answer to any question. We can sympathise with the fact that he has been under house arrest for many years, but many of his supporters have suffered long jails sentences, some have lost their lives. Yet even 11 years after the 2009 election he contested, Moussavi cannot come up with a clear statement on this Friday’s poll.
Former leftwingers who now support the ‘reformist’ factions of the Islamic Republic have also picked up the argument about saving the ‘republic’, as opposed to the ‘Islamic’ in the state’s name even though it is absolutely clear that electing a president in a Shia state, where the main authority is called the ‘supreme leader’, has nothing to do with republicanism. Of course, if Raisi wins there will be an uproar by ‘human rights activists’ and western governments about his role in the mass execution of political prisoners in the 1980s.
They will be right to condemn him. But let us not forget that those western governments have very selective memories when it comes to those responsible for executions of political opponents. It all comes down to whether the person responsible is a friend or a foe.
First published at: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1352/highlights-of-democracy/
Seven are the doors to hell
Yassamine Mather reports on the new restrictions, the disqualifications and what passes for debate in the presidential election campaign
Looking at current developments in the run-up to Iran’s June 18 presidential election, one could easily come to the conclusion that the leaders and institutions of the Shia republic are either extremely confident of their regime’s continued existence – despite continued sanctions, rising Covid numbers and recurring economic crises – or they are determined to commit political suicide.
As I have written on a number of occasions during previous presidential contests, even by the standards of bourgeois democracies, Iran’s have never been free nor fair. The choice is between candidates of various factions of a single organisation, formally a single party, to act as figurehead of Iran’s ‘Islamic’ republic. They must accept the constitution of the religious state and the role of the supreme leader – the ‘Guardian of the imbecile’…
This year additional conditions were added by the Guardian council, which decides who may stand: candidates had to be between 40 and 75, with at least one postgraduate qualification and no prison record (it was not clear whether this was supposed to exclude political prisoners, but in practice it did). Over 40 candidates from the various political groups that are, broadly speaking, allied with either the ‘reformist’ or conservative factions of the regime put themselves forward. But the Guardian Council disqualified most of them, including current first vice-president Eshaq Jahangiri, the international advisor to the supreme leader, and Ali Larijani, the former speaker of the majles (parliament), leaving just seven candidates. By this stage the election had become even more of an appointment decided by a Council of Guardians that acts on behalf of the (unelected) supreme leader than on previous occasions, when a semblance of competition – at least between the two main factions – was on the agenda, fuelling some interest in the choice between bad and worse.
The assumption is that the Guardian Council wants an uncontested election, resulting in victory for its favourite candidate, the rightwing judge, ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, who by all account holds some responsibility for the execution of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of leftwing political prisoners in the 1980s. Even the said ayatollah appeared to be shocked by his allies’ decision, claiming he preferred a genuine contest. By early June supreme leader Ali Khamenei was also getting involved, trying to distance himself from the unpopular decision made by the Guardian Council, by proclaiming that some candidates disqualified were unfairly treated:
They were accused of untrue things that were unfortunately spread throughout the internet too. Protecting people’s honour is one of the most important issues. I call on the responsible bodies to restore their honour.
Given Khamenei’s age and poor health, there are inevitably rumours about the significance of this presidential election and the more important question of his successor. There is speculation that there are differences between the Guardian Council and the current supreme leader regarding the choice of successor.
Raisi remains a strong contender for that post too, but there are also rumours that the current supreme leader might favour his son, Mojtaba Khamenei. While I have no reason to give credibility to any of these rumours, the fact that a senior cleric is accused of favouring a royal-style inherited succession speaks volumes about the current state of the ‘republic’.
Debates
The seven approved candidates have so far had two televised debates. Iran’s state TV has produced a modern-looking set, but that is the only positive thing one can say. The first was allegedly about ‘the economy’, yet the candidates were forbidden to mention sanctions or Iran’s foreign and regional policy – one would have thought both crucial factors.
As a result we heard all seven complaining about too much state intervention – this in a country where more than 85% of the economy is in private hands and neoliberalism is the state’s ‘second official religion’, almost on the same level as Shia Islam. All candidates used every opportunity to blame current president Hassan Rouhani and his administration for the terrible economic situation facing the country.
Now I am no fan of Rouhani and no doubt corruption has reached new heights during his presidency, but to claim that the fall in value of the Iranian currency and the stagnation in foreign trade have only one cause – ie, the failures of the Rouhani administration – is absurd. The elephant in the room was the failure to mention Donald Trump’s sanctions, and the reluctance of the European Union and China to enter into trade deals with Iran as a result. All this must have made most viewers think they were living in a parallel universe to the candidates. Apparently international issues are to be addressed in the third debate, but it remains to be seen if the secretive organs of the state will allow any discussion on Iran’s nuclear programme, Tehran’s interventions in the region and the war in Syria.
Amazingly Abdolnaser Hemmati, who is one of the two ‘reformists’ allowed to contend, also blamed the current economic situation on the government! It just so happens that he held the crucial post of governor of the Central Bank from 2018 – until he was replaced after announcing his candidacy for the presidency last month.
The Rouhani administration duly complained about the bias shown by the national broadcaster and demanded time to respond. That dispute is still going on. On June 10, Rouhani used a recorded session of a cabinet meeting to take a dig at the candidates: “We now know which sections of the state work very well: the military, the parliament and the judiciary. It is only the executive power that has problems.”
All seven offered financial incentives to various sections of the electorate in what looked like a desperate attempt to get votes. Most claimed to be experts in economic matters, with Hemmati declaring himself to be a professional economist, yet none of them seemed to have heard a whisper about the dramatic post-Covid changes in the US and world economy. They obviously have not paid any attention to Biden’s Keynesian programme, they seemed unaware of claims by many western governments that Covid had changed the agenda as far as the global political economy was concerned, and they seemed oblivious to the fact that a return to state intervention had become a necessity in almost all the advanced capitalist countries.
The candidates accused each other of exaggerating and even lying – lowering the tone to the level of the first Biden-Trump debate in the US.
Perhaps the most amusing section was when they started comparing their educational achievements – an MA or MSc as opposed to a PhD … But, firstly, even in bourgeois democracies there is absolutely no reason to believe that university degrees or postgraduate qualifications help politicians to perform their role. As one political analyst said after the first debate, most European countries have no such requirement for leadership candidates, while one UK prime minister, John Major, never even went to university. Secondly, while Iran’s higher-education institutions (where most of these gentlemen obtained their degrees) have grown considerably in the last four decades, some of them are of very poor quality and many of their qualifications are not worth the paper they are written on (a bit like some in the USA). Of course, Iran has some universities that are internationally recognised for their excellence. But. given the abysmal standards of the candidates in the first two debates, one can assume they are not shining examples of the country’s higher-education system.
Some have blamed the national broadcaster for the fiasco of the first debate, where candidates were each asked different questions, and there was coverage of the candidates’ own lacklustre performance in the second debate. However, Iran’s national broadcaster is part of the repressive organs of the state and the country’s problems have deeper roots than particular formats or processes, such as the way questions were posed.
Ridiculous
In order to judge how poor these debates were we should note that one of the main issues commented upon after the first was the change in appearance of Mohsen Rezaei, the conservative candidate who is a senior officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. On social media Iranian women were asking for the name and address of his plastic surgeon or Botox expert. What happened to all his wrinkles (media outlets have been posting ‘before’ and ‘after’ photographs)? The other ‘major’ event of last week was a TV interview with Hemmati’s wife. She is a better communicator than her husband, even though she was asked the usual family, personal questions.
Interestingly, all seven candidates claim to have women’s rights and gender equality at the forefront of their agenda, promising the usual bourgeois feminist crap about the number of women ministers who would be in their cabinet. And all claimed to be supporters of the rights of Iran’s national minorities: Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis … During Tuesday’s debates some of them attempted to say a few words in Turkish (the first language of Iranian Azeris), with varying degrees of success, depending on the candidate’s own origins.
In terms of both the format and the absurd claims and undeliverable promises, the debates have all the features of bourgeois presidential elections all over the world. Royalists and their ‘regime change from above‘ allies say the debates are at a low level and all candidates are very poor speakers, but, of course, they were unlikely to say anything else.
It should be noted that on such occasions it is easy to be nostalgic for past leaders, but many of us thought that both the timid young shah and the later arrogant older shah were terrible speakers. For his part, president Ruhollah Khomeini was an uneducated, ignorant man, who could talk for hours saying nothing of significance. Mohammad Khatami, Iran’s first ‘reformist’ president, was an unknown, insignificant cleric before his election. Prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign took off because of growing support amongst Iranian youth, who were angry and frustrated by the first term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. And Hassan Rouhani, who has presided over a corrupt and incompetent cabinet for the last eight years, is not exactly charismatic. He got elected in 2013 because Iranians were adamant they did not want Raisi as president.
In the current ‘election’ campaign Raisi’s ratings in a poll organised by the state media dropped considerably after the first debate and even further after the second. He did appear to be as calculating and ruthless as his reputation has led us to believe.
So far the main ‘reformist’ factions have refused to back either of the two ‘reformist’ candidates (the second being Mohsen Mehralizadeh), but this could change, as we approach June 18. However, irrespective of what happens, no-one in their right mind can justify taking part in that vote.
First published at: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1351/seven-are-the-doors-to-hell/
Principle, confusion and hope
Having looked at the birth and early years of the guerrillaist left in her first article Yassamine Mather turns to the internal struggles within the Fedai
Splits in the Fadai started in 1979, following the Islamist revolution, and are still going on. It is impossible to cover every one of them, but the main ones should be mentioned. The first, immediately after the Fadai leaders’ release from prison, was between the supporters of armed struggle and those who said that armed struggle could not be both a strategy and a tactic, and that clearly it could not work.
The problem was that the myths surrounding the Fadai guerrilla struggle did influence the uprising of 1979. On the other hand, many Fadai were becoming aware of their organisation’s weaknesses – not least its total divorce from the mass movement.
The supporters of the armed struggle as ‘tactic and strategy’ were in a small minority, but survived and still survive. To this day their slogan is: ‘The shah was the running dog of imperialism and so is the Islamic republic’. No theory, no analysis, but they still exist as a small group in exile, where clearly armed struggle against the Islamic republic is not practical.
The main division, however, obviously came with the minority-majority split, revolving around the analysis of not only the Islamic republic, but a whole set of issues, such as the nature of the current era. The majority held that it was one of imperialism versus socialism, as represented by the USA and the USSR. On Iran’s regime, they said that, although it was Islamic, the government was objectively moving Iran towards the ‘socialist camp’ and therefore should be supported. The main question in the minority-majority split concerned the nature of the Iranian government: was it progressive or counterrevolutionary?
The majority was led by those who claimed to have been close to the Fadai’s leading figure Bijan Jazani in prison. They were called Fadai Majority only because they constituted a majority on the central committee, although it soon became clear that they did not command a majority amongst supporters of the organisation. They considered the regime as anti-imperialist and gave it at first conditional and later full support.
Things became much more tense after the spring of 1979, with the government consolidating its power and being able to repress opposition forces. For that reason we see a number of specific events – not least the takeover of the US embassy by Islamic students. This was hailed by the Fadai Majority and most of the left outside Iran as an anti-imperialist act, but for the radical left in Iran it was a deliberate diversion, an attempt to stop the wave of political strikes and other forms of opposition to the Islamic regime.
It was this event that really brought the arguments within the Iranian left to a head. The Fadai Minority had walked out of the central committee, but drew in support from thousands of leftwing students and youth who did not want to follow the Islamic republic into the abyss. However, it was also true that the Fadai Majority retained some support among the working class.
The embassy incident was also significant, in that the government declared that anyone who did not support it must be a counterrevolutionary or a CIA agent. Counterrevolutionaries could be arrested and even executed – a danger that grew, once the Iran-Iraq war – which government supporters portrayed as a war against imperialism – started. Some on the left, including the Fadai Minority, adopted the line, originally put forward by ‘line three’ ex-Maoists, that the Iran-Iraq war was a reactionary conflict.
That meant you could now be arrested for being a member of the Fadai Minority – you were part of the US aggression against Iran, you were a traitor and you could easily be killed. By contrast, at this time the Fadai Majority might be invited into ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani’s office for consultations over the organisation of this or that event. Obviously by this stage we are talking about revolution and counterrevolution.
Both the Majority and the ‘official communist’ Tudeh Party definitely supported the government in repressing the rest of the left. By now the Majority was totally following the Moscow line and was very close to Tudeh. The Minority was telling workers that, while we defend Iran, we also have to fight the regime. But the Majority was saying, ‘Produce more – there is an anti-imperialist war and a war economy, and Iran is moving towards the socialist camp.’ One of the worst ‘Majority/Tudeh’ slogans of this period was: ‘Give heavy weapons to Pasdarans’ (Islamic Revolutionary Guards who were waging vicious attacks against the radical left). Let me also say that the very small Iranian Trotskyist groups were divided along very similar lines.
From this point on we are talking about two very different organisations. The Majority was able to operate openly until at least 1984, with offices in Tehran until 1982-83. The Minority, on the other hand, was considered a proscribed organisation, with the houses of leading figures raided and a lot of deaths in those first two years.
The first congress of the Fadai Minority shows the diversity of forces that had taken a united position against the Majority. For example, there was another split in this congress. Those in favour of joining the Mujahedin in the National Council of Resistance departed. There was also a Trotskyist Tendency and debates about entryism.
Apart from these political difficulties, it was a bad time generally for the Fadai Minority. Its secret printing press was discovered by the government and a lot of supporters were killed. Political debate became confused with security issues and formed a terrible backdrop of militarism and centralism within the Fadai – some of the blame was put unjustly on the Trotskyist Tendency. This marked the beginning of what I call total centralism in the Fadai Minority – a complete disregard for democracy by people who were preserving the organisation for the sake of preserving the organisation.
The whole ideology of the Fadai had always been dominated by talk of professional revolutionaries, heroes, the elite – dedicated people who have no other life, no other concern (and never meet anybody else either, because they might become ‘confused’ and do something not in the interests of the organisation). My personal experience of the Fadai began at that time, in the middle of this difficult period. But, for all its faults, the Fadai Minority remained for many years the main left organisation opposing the Islamic republic.
The Majority also suffered when a CIA plant in the Soviet embassy in Tehran gave the names of many Tudeh Party members to the Islamic government. Many leading members of the Majority were arrested too. It was the beginning of the end for those two organisations inside Iran – now what remains of them survive in exile. The workers who had illusions in the Majority had by then given up. By 1982 leading oil workers, who had gone with the Majority or Tudeh in the period of debate over whether the government was revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, left these organisations.
Kurdistan base
As for the Fadai Minority, we were forced to move most of our leading members to Kurdistan. The central committee kept one person in Tehran and ironically, as a woman, she could not be recognised by the regime. Although the government posted her photo on every lamppost, showing her without a headscarf, in real life she was totally covered up! She managed to produce a leftwing paper in the middle of Tehran until 1985. Despite the fact that the paper featured mass work among the class more prominently, the image of the heroic guerrillas persisted as a strong element for certain figures in the Fadai Minority.
So basically the organisation as a whole moved to Kurdistan, leaving some key figures in various cities – people who had not been involved in the various security scares. The Kurdistan period was both a good and bad time for the Fadai. It was a safer place than Iranian cities, but here was a Marxist organisation forced to work in the countryside amongst the peasantry, who hardly wanted to build socialism and to whom Fadai ideas were quite alien.
They were hospitable towards us, although I suspect this resulted from their hostility to the regime – which was based on Kurdish nationalism rather than any understanding of what the Fadai actually stood for. Quite clearly they were not religious in the way that the Islamic republic was, and that is true of the peasantry all over Iran – they have their own ways of expressing their religion. I felt we were a bit like aliens there, especially we women Fadai, who wore men’s clothes and carried a gun. The peasant women did not really take to us and the peasant men thought us very strange.
In Kurdistan the organisation needed a lot of backbone to survive such serious hardship. The winters were terribly cold and the summers very dry. Later, as the government mounted its offensive against us, we had to move from bases in villages to more mountainous areas, where the people were much more tribal and there were no real villages.
I think the beginning of corruption within the Fadai Minority came during the Kurdish period, when everyone had pragmatic reasons for demanding the right of passage through Iraq. The way many of us travelled to Kurdistan originally was via the southern part of Turkey. In winter it was hell – cold, mountainous, terribly dangerous – and, of course, there was a much easier way through Iraq. All the political organisations of the Iranian left, not just the Fadai Minority, agreed to accept the right of passage via Iraq – at a cost.
Later on there came the idea that in order to feed and clothe people it was necessary to accept financial aid, including from dubious sources. The Fadai were amongst the last to accept such aid, but it began in Kurdistan. So an organisation based on such high principles, whose heroes were supposed to be beyond criticism in the way they behaved, took the first small step of accepting money from Iraq, and so it went on. Today some organisations on the Iranian left see no contradiction in accepting US ‘regime change’ funds or money from Saudi Arabia or certain Israeli institutions (I assume on the basis that the end justifies the means).
Debate in our Kurdish base was very limited. It was not that there was no debate at all, but most people had to ask questions in writing. As the situation became more difficult, the central committee became even more centralised, so that dissent from the political line was seen as equivalent to treachery. Dissidents were not expelled, but were treated less favourably.
An example: four months after a congress, we found out about a pamphlet written by the Trotskyist Tendency – but only thanks to a superficial book, Leninism or Trotskyism, written by a central committee member, who denounced the tendency mainly through insults. The book made a wonderful U-turn regarding one of the Fadai’s longstanding positions: “In a future revolutionary Iran the Soviet Union will help us build heavy industries in order to achieve socialism.”
When in a written question some of us asked the author what the difference was between this and the Tudeh Party’s ‘non-capitalist road to development’ – the line that our founders had rebelled against – his comment was: “We are not treacherous like Tudeh!” Of course, the majority of members did not share his opinions, but we were never given the chance to debate such issues or hold another congress.
Another corrupting influence was the interference of Jalal Talebani’s group in Kurdistan – Talebani is now president of Iraq, of course. His group was one of those that controlled not just Iranian Kurdistan, but bordering areas in Turkish Kurdistan and part of Iraqi Kurdistan. There is a place known as the ‘valley of the parties’, between Iran, Iraq and Turkey. With high mountains on all sides, it was a safe place to locate your base, training schools, radio stations and so on.
Talebani’s group was dominant there. He had already moved well beyond anything to do with the left and this was more than 25 years ago. He was a bourgeois politician even then with a tribal, feudal background. He would meddle in the affairs of political groups, supporting one faction of this or that group against its central committee. The whole situation was pretty bad.
However, amongst the positives was the fact that people who wanted to fight the government arrived in numbers in Kurdistan. They had no history of involvement with the Fadai, no theoretical background, but unfortunately there was no real attempt to give them a political education. Most members and cadres only read the works of Lenin or of ‘martyred’ Fadai comrades.
One of the worst events was the battle for control of the Fadai radio station. Ordinary members wanted a congress and the central committee refused to organise one, because it knew it would lose power. It had coopted members who agreed with its line and there were many complaints about the lack of democracy. The political line of the people who attacked the radio station in order to take control of it from the central committee was pretty dodgy, and they moved gradually further to the right as time went by. (Later they were in discussions to rejoin the Fadai Majority, which gives you some indication of their trajectory.)
However, the central committee delayed the congress and stopped everybody having a proper discussion about our strategy and tactics, and our current political theory. Where did we stand now? We were no longer guerrillaist or Maoist and the Trotskyist Tendency had been expelled. Clearly some in the central committee did not see anything wrong with the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. But none of this was discussed. This situation threw into relief the political decline of the Fadai Minority.
Even with all these disasters in Kurdistan, even with the fact that the Fadai had not managed to gain much support inside Iran, they remained a very powerful force outside the country. When I was sent to the foreign committee in 1984, we had about 1,000 supporters in the US and around 100 in several European countries.
These supporters were doing a lot of work for the Fadai – fundraising, publicity, producing their own publications, including a student journal. But Fadai membership was totally different. Remember, this was an organisation of professional revolutionaries, and because recruitment had slowed considerably and many had died, there were probably only around 40 Fadai Minority members left, compared with 60 at the first congress.
Supporters had few rights. They could elect their own representatives, but these representatives had no influence on the organisation. At the end of the 20th century this model – a body of professional revolutionaries aided by supporters – was alien to most people, but we still kept it.
Most importantly, the Fadai still worked on a ‘need to know’ basis, so supporters had a distorted view of both the theory and practice of the organisation. It was very hard to do much to change this, because members like myself were not allowed to divulge ‘secret information’.
There was very little serious political discussion on the foreign committee. If in Kurdistan there was the excuse that we were fighting a war and did not want the enemy to take prisoners who knew too much and so on, in Europe that argument was really redundant.
Most of us were given so much to do and were literally so exhausted that we could not even read or study properly. It was not unusual to be sent to another continent at a few hours’ notice, so it was really a very disruptive time.
Many of us by 1985-86 had come to the conclusion that we could not work effectively, but you cannot just leave such an organisation. I resigned three times and was told each time that my resignation was not accepted! The central committee discussed my resignation and threw it in the bin. Eventually I just stopped working and went into hiding.
Lessons
What are the main lessons? First of all, one has to remember that it is easy to criticise all of this in retrospect, just as it is easy to underestimate the repression of the shah and the Islamic republic. The influence that the Fadai had in the birth of the new left and on the Iranian revolution is historic and cannot be taken away, though a very heavy price was paid for it.
But there were many mistakes – militarism, Stalinism, centralism, the culture of the heroic guerrilla and the professional revolutionary. As the organisation disintegrated, not surprisingly heroes suddenly became villains in the eyes of many supporters.
A lesson that I personally learnt is that without debate, without democracy, without the ability to discuss every aspect of theory, your organisation will end up as a sect rather than a serious force capable of leading a revolution. I also came to the conclusion that the end does not just justify the means. I know some people think I am very dogmatic and uncompromising, but my experience with the Fadai has made me very vigilant about the betrayal of principles. We started by being pragmatic on minor things and ended up compromising on very big issues.
The main Majority-Minority split had been inevitable. The two opposite lines – supporters of the Islamic Republic and those calling for its overthrow – could not survive in the same organisation. However, in the absence of proper debate even at that time, the Minority was a broad front, encompassing those who “wanted to build socialism with the help of the Soviet Union”, Trotskyists and a number of tendencies in between.
These differences were never debated properly, members and supporters decided their allegiance to various tendencies based on their personal connections, often unaware of what was being debated. Ironically, both in the Majority and Minority, most of those who were die-hard supporters of the Soviet Union are currently flag-bearers of ‘regime change from above’ (irrespective of who paves the way for this: Trump or Biden).
At the end of my stay in Kurdistan I was in a base with about 40 people and, apart from one other, I am the only survivor. That gives me a responsibility. I cannot just give up on the revolutionary struggle, because, whatever you think of the Fadai’s various leaders, the 38 people who died in that base were all Marxists: they all believed in and wanted to achieve socialism, though they knew they would not see it in their lifetime.
First published in the Weekly Worker: https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1334/principle-confusion-and-hope/